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Littlejohn: NLRB v. Canning Featuring the All-Powerful Senate: The National

NLRB V. CANNING FEATURING THE ALLPOWERFUL SENATE: THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD’S JOURNEY TO
EXTINCTON
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world where unions and individual workers are unable to
guarantee their rights.1 Grace Johnson, a teacher at a local elementary
school, is a member of the teachers’ union, the American Federation of
Teachers. Grace has taught at the same school for ten years, and she enjoys
her job. Right before Christmas break, she arrives at the school to discover
she has lost her job due to “budget reasons.” Grace is shocked, and does
not believe the budget is the only reason she was fired. She contacts her
union representative, and he tells her he will look into her case. Later that
month, the union representative finds out that Grace was replaced by a
non-union teacher. The union representative informs Grace that the
school may have discriminated against her because she is a union
employee, which is an unfair labor practice. Grace really wants her job
back, so the union representative files a complaint on her behalf with the
regional National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”), and
the union representative assures her that there is a good chance the NLRB
will overturn her discharge.
While Grace waits for a result from the regional NLRB, she struggles
to pay her bills because the school refuses to continue paying her. The
regional NLRB investigates and reports its findings to the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) who ultimately decides in favor of the school because
Grace was paid more than the non-union teacher; therefore, budget cuts
were a sufficient reason for her discharge. Grace is devastated, but the
union representative informs her that her case can be appealed to the
NLRB headquarters in Washington, D.C. Grace waits patiently, still
without a job or an income for three more months. To her dismay, she
learns the NLRB cannot decide any cases because it only has two
members. Grace is left with nothing because there is no way to appeal her
discharge.
All individuals should have a way to ensure their workers’ rights,
including unlawful discharge, regardless of the level of severity of an
issue. If workers’ rights and benefits were not guaranteed, the country
would revert back to the times before the National Labor Relations Act

This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author to illustrate the issues
presented in this Note.
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(“NLRA”).2 The NLRB provides regulation for employers, employees,
and unions in disputes arising from the labor relationship.3 If the NLRB
became extinct, there would be no enforcement of employer, employee, or
union benefits and rights.4
NLRB v. Canning arose after President Obama appointed three
members to the NLRB during a three day recess the Senate took from
January 3–6, 2012.5 The Supreme Court held that the recess appointment
power was more specific than President Obama interpreted.6 It held that
there must be a substantial break in the Senate—at least ten days—and the
Senate can declare when they are in session. 7
As a result, the holding invalidated the three recent appointments,
setting off a domino effect.8 Because the appointments were invalid, all of
the cases that those three members were involved in may be appealed due
to the lack of a quorum of valid members on the NLRB. 9 The re-evaluation
of these cases and possible modification of decisions could have a grave
impact on labor and employment law.10

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012) (showing the various parts of the NLRA).
See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, WHAT WE DO, http://www.nlrb.gov/whatwe-do [http://perma.cc/Y7A4-PKKP] (displaying the rights the NLRB protects and various
ways to resolve issues); see also NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RIGHTS WE PROTECT,
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect [http://perma.cc/Z96Z-JD57] (explaining the
rights the NLRB protects).
4
See Ian Millhiser, In Less Than 5 Years, Unions Could Lose Their Legal Rights—And It’s the
Supreme Court’s Fault, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 13, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
justice/2014/01/13/3155141/5-years-unions-lose-legal-rights-supreme-courts-fault/
[http://perma.cc/8PXD-9WPZ] (predicting what would happen if the NLRB were
powerless to act). The article states:
If the NLRB is powerless to act, there will be no one to enforce workers’
rights to join a union without intimidation from their employer. No one
to enforce workers’ rights to join together to oppose abusive work
conditions. And no one to make an employer actually bargain with a
union.
Id.
5
See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557–58 (2014) (elaborating on why Noel Canning
filed a case against the NLRB); infra Part II.D (discussing further NLRB v. Canning).
6
See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (holding that the Recess Appointment Clause allows
the President to fill any vacancy as long as the break in the Senate is of sufficient length).
7
See id. at 2567 (elaborating on the Supreme Court’s holding).
8
See id. at 2578 (stating that President Obama’s recess appointments were
unconstitutional); Justin Keith et al., The Supreme Court Declares a Recess for Recess
Appointments, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/print/
article/supreme-court-declares-recess-recess-appointments [http://perma.cc/4587-WU8K]
(explaining the reason why members were invalidated).
9
See infra Part II.C (discussing the quorum requirement of the NLRB); see also New
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (holding that a valid quorum consists of
three members).
10
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the effect reexamining cases could have on the NLRB).
2
3
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In the past five years, there have been three instances when the
NLRB’s membership fell to a mere two members on what is statutorily
construed to be a five-member board.11 Two of these three instances were
solved through the presidential recess appointment power.12 The holding
in NLRB v. Canning made the use of the recess appointment power to fix
shortages on the NLRB more difficult.13 As a result, if the President and
Senate do not agree on an appointment to the NLRB, the Board’s
membership will continue to fall as each member’s term ends, and the
board will eventually become non-operational.14 Therefore, the NLRB
needs to change its enabling statute in order to continue to operate
effectively and prevent the changes to presidential recess appointment
power from affecting its declining membership. This Note recommends
that Congress amend 29 U.S.C. § 153 to ensure the NLRB is operational if
appointments are not proposed by the President or confirmed by the
Senate.15
First, Part II discusses the history of the NLRB, the developments and
evolution of the Board, and the cases that have influenced the board’s
structure.16 Next, Part III analyzes how the NLRB’s operation has been
disrupted in the past and will continue to be disrupted if no changes are
made.17 In addition, Part III proposes an amendment to the NLRB’s
enabling statute, correcting the NLRB’s membership problems.18 Finally,
See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [http://perma.cc/HC47V94G] (displaying that the NLRB has fallen to below three members twelve times since its
creation with three of those times being in the past five years).
12
See id. (showing that after New Process Steel in 2010, two members were recess
appointed); see also NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557–58 (2014) (explaining President
Obama’s recess appointment of three members to the NLRB).
13
See infra Part II.D (reviewing NLRB v. Canning); see also infra Part II.E.1 (discussing the
actions the NLRB has taken thus far).
14
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring Senate confirmation on presidential
appointments); see also Ian Millhiser, Why Senate Democrats Had To Invoke The “Nuclear
Option,” THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 21, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/
11/21/2972671/senate-democrats-invoke-nuclear-option/ [http://perma.cc/FS2M-N5E4]
[hereinafter Millhiser, Nuclear Option] (“[A]ll five slots on the NLRB are now filled by Senateconfirmed appointees—this solution is only temporary. NLRB members serve five year
terms, so the Senate GOP will get another opportunity to shut down federal labor law when
these terms expire . . . .”).
15
See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining the language that this Note proposes to add to the
NLRB’s enabling statute); see also The Legislative Process, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/
[http://perma.cc/NX2L-G5E4] (examining the process of amending a statute).
16
See infra Part II (explaining the history and background to the problem this Note
proposes to fix).
17
See infra Part III.A–B (analyzing the NLRB’s membership problem).
18
See infra Part III.C (providing the proposed amendment’s language).
11
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Part IV concludes with a summation of how the proposed amendment
addresses the current problems.19
II. BACKGROUND
The NLRB is an independent administrative agency that enforces and
makes decisions regarding employee, employer, and union rights. 20 The
NLRB was created in 1935 and has a variety of functions in the field of
labor and employment law, including enforcing an employee’s right to
collectively bargain and join unions, and preventing unfair labor
practices.21 Throughout history, case law changed how members are
appointed to the NLRB and how many members are required in order for
the NLRB to function properly.22 Specifically, NLRB v. Canning and New
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB changed these practices.23
First, Part II.A explains the history of the NLRB.24 Part II.B discusses
how the NLRB is organized and the functions it performs. 25 Next, Part
II.C discusses the quorum requirement of the NLRB and the impact of New
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB.26 Part II.D explains NLRB v. Canning and how
it impacts the NLRB.27 Part II.E establishes the NLRB’s fallout since the
NLRB v. Canning decision, and the Senate’s desire to change the NLRB. 28
Finally, Part II.F introduces the Federal Communications Commission as
a possible model for the NLRB.29

See infra Part IV (concluding the reasons why this Note proposes the best solution).
See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, WHO WE ARE, http://www.nlrb.gov/whowe-are [http://perma.cc/3DTC-CFG4] (stating that the NLRB is an independent agency and
noting the rights it protects).
21
See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE 1935 PASSAGE OF THE WAGNER ACT,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act
[http://perma.cc/C85Y-LG38] (explaining how the NLRB was created); see also Julia Di Vito,
Note, The New Meaning of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 314
(2011) (establishing why the NLRB was created and what it does).
22
See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (requiring three members
for there to be a valid quorum); see also NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577–78 (2014)
(stating that the Recess Appointments Clause can be used to appoint members only when
there is a sufficient break in the Senate).
23
See infra Part II.C–D (displaying the case law that has changed the NLRB).
24
See infra Part II.A (outlining the history of the NLRB).
25
See infra Part II.B (explaining the structure and function of the NLRB).
26
See infra Part II.C (showing the impact that New Process Steel had on the NLRB).
27
See infra Part II.D (analyzing the impact of NLRB v. Canning).
28
See infra Part II.E (stating what the NLRB has already done).
29
See infra Part II.F (examining the structure of the Federal Communications
Commission).
19
20
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A. The History of the National Labor Relations Board
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”) created the
NLRB.30 The purpose of the NLRA was “[t]o diminish the causes of labor
disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, [and]
to create a National Labor Relations Board . . . .”31 The NLRA afforded
workers with three rights: (1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain
collectively; and (3) the right to engage in strikes, picketing, and other
concerted activities.32 The NLRB originally consisted of a three-member
30
See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (displaying the
original NLRA); see also S. 1958, 74th Cong., § 3(a) (1935) (stating the interest to establish the
NLRB). The NLRA was created to allow workers to unionize and engage in collective
bargaining. FRANK W. MCCULLOCH & TIM BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 3 (Ernest S. Griffith & Hugh Langdon Elsbree eds., 1974). The NLRA consists of three
separate statutes: The National Labor Relations Act or Wagner Act of 1935, the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947, and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. Id. at 16. When President Roosevelt signed
the NLRA he issued a message:
A better relationship between labor and management is the high
purpose of this act. By assuring the employees the right of collective
bargaining it fosters the development of the employment contract on a
sound and equitable basis. By providing for an orderly procedure for
determining who is entitled to represent the employees, it aims to
remove one of the chief causes of wasteful economic strife. By
preventing practices which tend to destroy the independence of labor it
seeks, for every worker within its scope, that freedom which is justly
his.
Id. at 18.
31
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, pmbl., 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935). “In the
midst of economic strife, the Act sought to establish a uniform set of principles with
employee free choice regarding unionization . . . .” John W. Bowers, Section 8(a)(2) and
Participative Management: An Argument for Judicial and Legislative Change in a Modern
Workplace, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 525, 533 (1992). “Senator Wagner[] believed that enforcement
of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively with employers would achieve
industrial peace and stability.” Id. at 534.
32
See JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28–29 (H. Victoria Hedian et al.
eds., 6th ed. 2012) (establishing the rights that the Wagner Act provided). Section 7 was one
of the most important portions of the NLRA. Id. at 28. Section 7 stated: “Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Id.
Sections 3–6 of the NLRA created the NLRB. See id. at 29 (establishing the NLRB to
administer the rights of the NLRA). Section 9 of the NLRA furthered this creation by giving
the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over questions of employee representation. Id. See also
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 3–6, 49 Stat. 449, 451–52 (1935)
(displaying the structure of the NLRB as it was created in 1935). Sections 3 and 4 created
structural guidelines for the NLRB. See id. §§ 3–4 (noting the structure and salary of the
Board). Section 5 stated that the principle office would be the District of Columbia and that
the Board or any agent of the Board may prosecute any inquiry necessary to its function in
any part of the United States. Id. § 5. Next, Section 6 allowed the Board to make rules and
regulations. Id. § 6.
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board with five-year staggered terms.33 “The three-member NLRB was
entrusted with administering both the unfair labor practice and the
election provisions of the law.”34 At the time of creation, the NLRB faced
strong resistance from critics who felt it was one-sided in nature and
should be unconstitutional.35
First, the right to organize is the right to join together as a group or join a union. See
Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223,
265 (2005) (elaborating on the right to join unions). Next, the right to bargain collectively
“consists of negotiations between an employer and a group of employees so as to determine
the conditions of employment.” Collective Bargaining and Labor Arbitration: An Overview,
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collective_bargaining
[http://perma.cc/4BUP-AZFE]. Last, the right to engage in strikes, picketing, and other
concerted activities means that employees have the right to protest the way their employer
is treating them. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE,
http://www.nlrb.gov/strikes [http://perma.cc/9Z3U-3FB8] (explaining further the right to
strike).
33
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 13 (presenting the structure of the
NLRB). See also National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935)
(discussing the terms of the NLRB members). The NLRB’s terms are structured in the
following manner:
One of the original members shall be appointed for a term of one year,
one for a term of three years, and one for a term of five years, but their
successors shall be appointed for terms to five years each, except that
any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only of the
unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed.
Id.
34
MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 24. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub.
L. No. 74-198, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (“Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”). In addition, Section 8 governs
what is an unfair labor practice. Id. § 8; see also John Jacob Kobus, Jr., Note, Establishing
Corporate Counsel’s Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343, 1398 (1995)
(explaining that an employer may not interfere with an employee’s rights). In the election
process, the NLRB may investigate when a question affecting commerce arises, which
concerns the representation of employees. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198,
§ 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935).
In addition to the NLRA establishing the national office of the NLRB, it also established
twenty-one regional offices around the country. MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at
25. Regional directors and regional attorneys supervise the work of attorneys and
investigators. Id. Today, the Board has twenty-six regional offices located in various areas
around the country.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, REGIONAL OFFICES,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices
[http://perma.cc/93PP-DRKD].
Typically, parties will first send a complaint to the regional NLRB, and if it is not resolved in
its process then the national office of the NLRB looks at it. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, INVESTIGATE CHARGES, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges
[http://perma.cc/HE24-UE9B] (outlining the process for filing charges and appealing
charges).
35
See HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 30–31 (arguing that the NLRA was a “one-sided” act);
see also JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 16–18 (Harvard Univ. Press 2014)
(highlighting Republican disapproval of unions); Labor Day Brings Focus to Economy,
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As a result, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 amended the NLRA.36 The
Taft-Hartley Act shifted the NLRA’s focus on the rights of employees and
unions to a more balanced concentration “that added restrictions on
unions and also guaranteed certain freedoms of speech and conduct to
employers and individual employees.”37 The Taft-Hartley Act changed
the composition of the NLRB from three to five members.38 This growth
was a welcomed change since three members were not enough to keep up
with the heavy workload of the NLRB. 39 Further, the Taft-Hartley Act
Declining Union Membership, FOX NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2014/09/01/holiday-returns-focus-to-impact-organized-labor-on-economy-decliningunion/ [http://perma.cc/F7SQ-U2DM] (showing a decline in union support). Many critics
strictly opposed the NLRA’s favor of organized labor. ROSENFELD, supra note 35, at 17. Critic
James MacGregor Burns wrote that the NLRA was “the most radical legislation passed
during the New Deal, in the sense that it altered fundamentally the nation’s politics by
vesting massive economic and political power in organized labor.” MCCULLOCH &
BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 18 (internal quotations omitted).
36
See Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (displaying the contents of
the Taft-Hartley Act). See also HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 34, 36 (presenting the need for
an amendment to the NLRA). The problem areas were:
(1) the secondary boycott, which had proved to be a potent tool in the
hands of some unions, injuring not only the immediate parties to the
labor dispute, but disinterested third parties as well; (2) closed- and
union-shop agreements, which in many instances had led to abuse and
certainly contributed to labor’s political and economic strength; (3)
strikes and picketing, which had often turned into violence when unions
were unable to achieve their goals by peaceful means; (4) corruption,
which had appeared in some unions, although it was not as conspicuous
during the 1940s as it later became during the 1957 McClellan Senate
Committee on Improper Activities in Labor-Management Relations
investigation; and (5) frequent jurisdictional disputes between unions in
the construction industry, which had halted many large projects for long
periods as unions bickered about the rights of different employees to
various job assignments.
Id. at 38.
37
HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 41. The Taft-Hartley Act amended Section 1 to be directed
equally at labor unions by stating that “[c]ertain practices by some labor
organizations . . . have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce . . . through strikes . . . or concerted activities . . . . The elimination of such
practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.” Id. The
Taft-Hartley Act also amended Section 7 of the NLRA by adding a provision, which gave
employees the right to refrain from joining a labor organization. Id. at 42.
38
See id. at 42 (establishing the change in the NLRB from a three-member board to a fivemember board).
39
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 45 (expanding the NLRB from three to
five members). “Given the Board’s heavy work load, this was not a controversial
amendment.” Id. The statistics reveal that the NLRB handled on average 8700 cases per year
until the Taft-Hartley Amendment. See National Labor Relations Board, Twelfth Annual
Report of the National Labor Relations Board for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1947, UNITED
STATES PRINTING OFFICE 1, 83 (1947) (displaying a chart with the number of cases the NLRB
handles each year). See also infra Part II.B (explaining all of the NLRB’s duties).
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required at least a three-member quorum for decisions, which became a
hurdle for the NLRB.40
The last amendment to the NLRA was the Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959, which was a response to the abuse of union power, even though it
actually made very few changes to the NLRA.41 Since the LandrumGriffin Act, there have been no other major changes to the NLRB or its
enabling statute.42 Today, the NLRB consists of up to five members who
perform a variety of functions, including:
conducting elections,
investigating charges, facilitating settlements, enforcing orders, and
deciding cases.43 These duties are split between regional offices and the
40
See Di Vito, supra note 21, at 314–15 (stating that the NLRB can delegate its authority).
The new portion of Section 3(b) states:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. A vacancy
in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to
exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board
shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two
members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant
to the first sentence hereof.
Id. at 315. See also infra Part II.B–C (addressing the quorum requirement of the NLRB).
41
See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (amending the NLRA to create a fairer agreement for both
employees and employers). See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 65
(explaining how the Landrum-Griffin Act amended the NLRA). It specifically amended
seven portions of the Taft-Hartley Act. See id. at 65–69 (outlining all seven areas of the
amendment). First, the Landrum-Griffin Act closed the loop-holes in secondary boycotts by
adding a prohibition against hot-cargo agreements to Section 8. Id. at 65–66. Next, it
regulated organization and recognition picketing by creating a new unfair labor practice
prohibition against unions. Id. at 66. Then, it adjusted the pre-hire requirements by making
an exception for the construction industry. Id. It also allowed economic strikers, strike
replacements, and non-strikers to vote in elections. Id. at 66–67. It permitted the Board to
delegate functions to the regional boards. MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 67–
68. Last, the Landrum-Griffin Act repealed the non-communist affidavit provisions and
provided that state courts and agencies could regulate the interstate labor disputes. Id. at 68.
Overall, “the new legislation made only relatively minor changes in the fundamental
structure of the federal labor laws erected by the [NLRA].” Id. at 69.
42
See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (enabling the NLRB to act as an independent agency).
43
See STANLEY R. STRAUSS & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1–3 (5th ed. 1996) (establishing the responsibilities of
the NLRB). The NLRB’s major responsibilities include “the investigation, processing, and
resolution of unfair labor practice charges and the determination of which labor
organizations, if any, should represent employees in collective bargaining matters.” Id. at 1.
See also WHAT WE DO, supra note 3 (explaining all the functions of the NLRB). In order to
unionize, an employee must show that at least thirty percent of employees at the workplace
are interested in joining a union and then notify the NLRB. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, CONDUCT ELECTIONS, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections
[http://perma.cc/89WC-HY64]. In addition, the NLRB investigates any charges filed in
regard to a violation of NLRA rights. See INVESTIGATE CHARGES, supra note 34 (explaining
the process that the NLRB follows to investigate charges). These charges can resolve
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national board.44 The purpose of the regional and national offices is to
uphold the NLRA by ensuring the rights of employees, employers, and
unions.45
settlements or result in a decision from an ALJ if a settlement cannot be reached. WHAT WE
DO, supra note 3. Last, if the parties do not voluntarily uphold the order the NLRB has issued,
it must seek enforcement from the Court of Appeals. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
ENFORCE ORDERS, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/enforce-orders [http://perma.cc/
CT55-DGU7].
44
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 79–81 (dividing the duties of the NLRB
between the national and regional offices). The regional boards initiate and investigate all
the cases that the NLRB handles. Id. at 81. The regional boards also conduct all the union
elections. Id. This Note will only focus on the national duties of the NLRB.
45
See WHAT WE DO, supra note 3 (establishing all the NLRB’s duties and its purpose); see
also National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, pmbl., 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (showing
the purpose of the NLRA). The NLRB’s regional offices are analogous to the trial court level
in a court system; they investigate, research and discuss each unfair labor practice case. See
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCESS CHART,
http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process/unfair-labor-practice-process-chart
[http://perma.cc/K6HB-6QLZ] (displaying the process for filing an unfair labor practice
charge). An unfair labor practice case arises from a violation of Section 8 of the NLRA, which
governs the activities employers shall not engage in, the activities unions shall not engage
in, and the activities that both are prohibited from engaging in. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012)
(highlighting the unfair labor practices). See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30,
at 143 (listing the prohibited activities for employers and unions). Employers shall not:
[i]nterfere with, coerce, or restrain employees[;] . . . [a]ssist or dominate
labor organizations[;] . . . [d]iscriminate against employees to
discourage or encourage union membership, except that a lawful union
security clause may be signed[;] . . . [d]iscriminate against employees
because they have given testimony or filed charges with the Board[;
or] . . . [r]efuse to bargain in good faith with a majority union.
Id. Unions shall not:
[c]oerce or restrain employees or interfere with management’s choice of
a bargaining agent[;] . . . [c]ause an employer to discriminate against
employees illegally[;] . . . [r]efuse to bargain in good faith with an
employer[;] . . . [e]ngage in secondary boycotts or jurisdictional
strikes[;] . . . [c]harge
excessive
or
discriminatory
initiation
fees[;] . . . [e]ngage in featherbedding[; or] . . . [e]ngage in organization
or recognition picketing.
Id. Finally, neither a union nor employer shall “[e]nter into ‘hot cargo’ agreements.” Id.
When the charge is received, an attorney is assigned to investigate the facts and conduct
any interviews needed. Id. at 85. After investigation, the regional director receives a
recommendation whether to pursue the unfair labor practice complaint. Id. If at the end of
this process a person is not satisfied he or she can appeal the decision by petitioning the
national NLRB to review the case. See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 85–89.
(stating that it is simple to appeal to the national office of the NLRB).
In addition to investigating, deciding, settling, and enforcing orders on cases, the
regional offices also facilitate representation elections. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD,
THE
NLRB
PROCESS,
http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process
[http://perma.cc/F7UR-C5KF] (displaying a chart which describes the process of
representation elections). When a party files a petition for a representation election with the
union office, it is investigated and determined. Id. Then, it can go through either consent
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The history of the NLRB significantly influenced how the Board
operates today.46 The NLRA established the NLRB, its purpose, and the
duties it performs.47 Although the amendments to the enabling statute
helped the NLRB evolve, cases have also impacted the NLRB’s
organization.48
B. The NLRB’s Organization
The NLRB is organized into a five-member board at the national level
with twenty-six regional offices.49 The President either appoints members
of the NLRB with Senate confirmation, or the President appoints members
by using the recess appointment power.50 First, Part II.B.1 discusses the
NLRB’s structure.51 Next, Part II.B.2 explains how NLRB members are
appointed.52
1.

How the NLRB is Structured

At the national level, each of the five board members has their own
Chief Counsel and staff of attorneys. 53 These members help the NLRB
review the records of unfair labor practice cases and write the decision of
each case.54 The NLRB also has a General Counsel, which supervises the

procedures, in which parties consent to an election and waive their hearing, or other formal
procedures. Id. If a petition goes through the formal procedures, a hearing is held, a decision
is made by the regional director, and parties may request for a review of the decision. Id.
After this process, the regional director conducts the election and if there are no objections,
the director issues results. Id.
46
See supra Part II.A (explaining how the NLRB was created and the changes that have
been made to the Board since its creation).
47
See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, pmbl., 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935)
(showing the purpose of the NLRA).
48
See infra Part II.C−D (elaborating on the New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB and NLRB v.
Canning holdings and their effect on the NLRB).
49
See REGIONAL OFFICES, supra note 34 (stating that the NLRB has twenty-six regional
offices around the country). See also TANJA L. THOMPSON, GWYNNE A. WILCOX & BARRY J.
KEARNEY, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 248 (BNA Supplement 2013) (establishing that there used to be thirtytwo offices). “The regional office restructuring program began with the merger of regional
offices in Atlanta, Georgia . . . and Winston-Salem, North Carolina . . . .” Id.
50
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presenting the presidential appointment power); see also
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (granting the President recess appointment power).
51
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the structure of the NLRB).
52
See infra Part II.B.2 (examining how members get appointed to the NLRB).
53
See HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 2826 (explaining all of the components that make up
the national office of the NLRB).
54
See id. (expanding on the role of the legal staff of the NLRB). The role of legal staff is as
follows:
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attorneys on the board, governs different aspects of the regional offices,
and oversees the NLRB as a whole.55 In addition, the NLRB’s ALJs preside
over unfair labor practice hearings.56 Although the NLRB has many parts,
this Note focuses on the five-member national board and its role in labor
and employment law.57
The national level of the NLRB is analogous to a court of appeals
because it investigates contested cases and elections.58 Each year, the
NLRB issues approximately 1400 decisions from contested cases.59 In
If the case is a simple one, clearly covered by Board precedent, the legal
staff will often prepare a draft decision for approval by a three-member
panel of the Board. If the decision raises arguable questions, it may be
referred for further consideration to a subpanel of supervisory attorneys
from staffs of the three different Board members and then to a panel of
three Board members. Only cases thought to be particularly important
are discussed by the full Board.
Id.
55
See id. at 2827 (“General Counsel ‘shall exercise general supervision over all attorneys
employed by the Board . . . and over the officers and employees in the regional offices.’”).
The General Counsel’s authority is not reviewable by the courts. Id. There are four main
divisions of the General Counsel: Division of Enforcement Litigation, Division of Advice,
Division of Operations-Management, and Division of Administration. Id. at 2828. The
Division of Enforcement Litigation handles all enforcement, review, and contempt litigation
in the court of appeals and Supreme Court. HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 2828. The Division
of Advice gives legal advice to regional offices, the injunction litigation branch, and the
policy branch. Id. The Division of Operations-Management coordinates the work with both
the regional offices and the national office. Id. Last, the Division of Administration aids with
administrative, fiscal, and personnel management services for both the Board and the
General Counsel. Id. Although the General Counsel does a lot for the NLRB, it is not the
focus of this Note.
56
See id. (establishing the duties of ALJs on the NLRB). The ALJs conduct formal hearings
for all of the General Counsel’s complaints. Id. These judges function like trial court judges
in non-jury hearings because they perform many of the same duties. See HIGGINS, JR., supra
note 32, at 2829 (comparing ALJs in NLRB proceedings to trial court judges). The decisions
of the ALJs are final unless the parties appeal. Id.
57
See infra Part III (analyzing the national office and structure of the NLRB).
58
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 82 (explaining the process the national
office uses to review cases). See also STRAUSS & HIGGINS, supra note 43, at 85−105 (detailing
the intricate, trial-like process for appealing a regional board decision). After the regional
board issues a complaint, an ALJ presides over the case at a hearing. Id. at 94–99. At the
close of the hearing and submission of the briefs, the judge issues a decision containing
findings of fact, conclusions, and the reasons or basis of its decision. Id. at 99. After the
decision is issued, if a party wants a reconsideration or rehearing of the case, he or she must
file a motion within twenty-eight days of the issuance of the decision. Id. at 103. The motion
must state the error in the decision and it is looked over by a panel of NLRB members. Id.
59
MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 82. An unfair labor practice case starts with
an aggrieved employee filing a charge that an employer or labor organization committed an
unfair labor practice. Id. at 85. Any person can file a charge with the NLRB even if they do
not have an interest in the outcome of the case. Id. When the regional office receives the
charge, an attorney investigates the facts, which sometimes involves an interview of the
aggrieved party or witnesses. Id. The attorney then recommends to the regional director
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order to review a case or contested election, the NLRB examines the record
that the regional office and the ALJ created.60 After reviewing the record,
the NLRB rules on the issue, which requires at least three votes to be
valid.61
Any party who is not satisfied with the ruling of the NLRB can appeal
to the federal court of appeals.62 The federal court system typically
upholds the decisions of the NLRB and may give deference to the Board
because of its expertise in labor and employment law.63 Critics maintain
that one problem when appealing to a federal court is that the NLRB’s
order is put on hold during an appeal, which means employees remain in
limbo while their case is decided.64 Scholars have also argued that this
that the complaint either be charged or dismissed. Id. A majority of cases are settled once a
complaint is issued, but the cases that are not settled are scheduled for a formal hearing. Id.
at 86. The General Counsel of the regional office represents the employee and has the burden
of proof. MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 87. The other party then attempts to
prove its defense. Id. At the end of the hearing, the parties are entitled to file briefs for the
ALJ to review. Id. After the ALJ decides, he or she writes a formal Decision and
Recommendations, which “summarizes the issues, states the facts as the judge finds them,
discusses applicable provisions of the statute and precedents, and then determines that the
Act has or has not been violated.” Id. at 89.
60
See supra notes 45, 59 and accompanying text (explaining the regional and ALJ review
process). “When a case reaches the Board on appeal from an [ALJ’s] decision, the executive
secretary assigns it to one Board member, who, in turn, assigns it to a legal assistant for
primary research and analysis.” MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 90. Most cases
are decided by a subpanel of experienced representatives of the three board members
assigned to the case. Id. The three board members review the tentative disposition that the
experienced representatives made before it becomes final. Id. These decisions are then
circulated to all nonparticipating board members for extra safeguarding. Id. If a case is
difficult or controversial, the full board reviews it during a weekly meeting of all of the NLRB
members. Id.
61
See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (stating that the NLRB
needs three members to have a valid quorum); see also infra Part II.C (showing the facts and
reasoning of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB).
62
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116 (“Any party who has been
aggrieved by an unfair labor practice decision of the Board may appeal to the federal circuit
courts of appeals.”). Because the NLRB’s orders are not self-enforcing, more than half of
unfair labor practice decisions are either appealed to the court of appeals or are taken to the
courts by the board to seek enforcement. Id. The process of appealing to a federal court is
also very expensive and can cost on average $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation,
60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010).
63
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–17 (stating that approximately
eighty-five percent of all cases from the NLRB that are appealed to the court of appeals are
upheld); see also Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1022 (2005)
(stating that the federal courts are not experts in labor law).
64
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 118 (“[A]n employee who has been
discharged illegally, for example, must wait for an additional year after the Board’s decision
in his favor before he is entitled to reinstatement of his former job and to back pay.”). This
timeline could greatly inconvenience and even harm employees who have not been able to
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judicial review process interferes with the NLRB’s ability to do its job and
overburdens the courts.65 Overall, the federal courts of appeals helps to
keep the board from making improper decisions. 66 In order to maintain
this structure, members must be appointed to the NLRB.67
2.

Appointing Members to the NLRB

The President appoints each of the five members on the NLRB for a
term of five years.68 The presidential appointment process has two steps.69
First, the President must nominate a member whom he or she believes is
qualified to be on the NLRB.70 Then, the Senate must confirm the
President’s nomination by a supermajority, which consists of a three-fifths
vote or sixty senators.71 Recently, the Senate invoked the “nuclear
find other jobs. Id. In addition, this process could deter parties from asking for a review of
their case if they need what little back pay they can get now. Id. This practice not only delays
a party from finding a remedy, but also decreases the overall administration of the NLRA.
Id.
65
See id. at 116 (arguing that some people believe the judicial review process should not
be afforded to all parties because it slows down the process and burdens the federal court
system); see also Introduction: Reform in the Federal Court System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 685, 685
(1993) (stating that the federal courts are overburdened and due for a reform).
66
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116 (explaining the judicial review
process). In addition to parties being able to appeal to the federal court, the NLRB also has
to present its orders to the appellate level court in order for them to be enforced. Id. “As a
practical matter this means that each year approximately 350 to 400 new NLRB cases end up
in the courts of appeals.” Id. Based on other agencies, the NLRB decides more cases which
are subject to judicial review than any other agency. Id.
67
See infra Part II.B.2 (demonstrating how members are appointed to the NLRB).
68
See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (displaying the policies for nomination to the NLRB). If a
member is chosen to fill a vacancy on the Board, his or her term shall last until the end of the
term of the person who created the vacancy. Id. § 153(a). See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN,
supra note 30, at 107 (establishing the confirmation process of NLRB members). This
appointment power does not give full power to the President or to the Senate because both
have to agree on a nomination. See John C. Roberts, The Struggle Over Executive Appointments,
2014 UTAH L. REV. 725, 726 (2014) (arguing that the appointment power is split by the
branches of government). Throughout history the Senate obstructed presidential nominees
to agencies by filibustering or simply not deciding an appointment. Id. at 732. On the other
hand, recess appointment power gives the President the ability to overcome any tactics the
Senate uses to stop the appointment. Id. This change greatly increased the President’s
power. Id. at 735.
69
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 113 (discussing the two step
confirmation process). Although some appointments have been “political,” both the
management and the labor side are informally contacted by the Secretary of Labor prior to
an appointment being announced. Id.
70
See id. (elaborating on presidential appointments); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 273–80 (2000) (considering whether the Senate can
condition a President’s choice of nomination by mandating certain qualifications).
71
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving appointment power to the President). This
section states:
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option[,]” which changed the number of votes needed to confirm an
appointment from three-fifths to a majority.72 Although the nuclear
option can make it easier for appointments to be confirmed, there are
roadblocks, such as political gridlock and Senate inaction, which make
presidential nominations more difficult. 73
The other method of appointing members to the NLRB is through
recess appointment power.74 During the period of time from the NLRB’s
creation in 1935 until the 1980s, the Senate confirmed the presidential
nominations to the NLRB and recess appointments were never utilized. 75
After Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the Senate began to obstruct NLRB
appointments by delaying or voting against them. 76 This change in
appointments led Presidents to invoke their recess appointment power
from the Constitution in order to bypass Senate confirmation.77 This
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the [S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . .
Id. See also Orrin G. Hatch, How 52 Senators Made 60=51, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 9,
12
(2014),
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-law-policyreview/online/hatch_25_stan_l_poly_rev_online_9.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SFE9-PY47]
(stating that prior to the nuclear option, a three-fifths vote was required for appointment).
72
See Hatch, supra note 71, at 12 (explaining how the “nuclear option” works); see also
Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (detailing the nuclear option); Z. Byron Wolf, What’s
the Nuclear Option?, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/21/
politics/nuclear-option-explainer/ [http://perma.cc/Z5Y7-UWHP] (describing the nuclear
option). The nuclear option was a big change because for the five preceding years the Senate
blocked confirmation of appointments by filibustering. See Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra
note 14 (noting the state of appointments prior to the nuclear option).
73
See infra Part II.B.2 (commenting how important party alignment is to presidential
appointment power).
74
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (illustrating the President’s recess appointment power).
The clause states that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the
End of their next Session.” Id. Many scholars analyzed the Recess Appointments Clause and
“argued that the Appointments Clause is inherently political and must be approached with
its principal purpose in mind—to ensure the smooth and sustained functioning of the
national government in all its vast and varied fields of responsibility.” Roberts, supra note
68, at 732.
75
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 107 (“[T]he Senate rarely exercises its
power to challenge the President’s choices for membership on any of the federal regulatory
agencies.”); see also Roberts, supra note 68, at 732 (stating that after the 1980s the Senate began
to challenge the President’s nominations to administrative agencies).
76
Roberts, supra note 68, at 732. “In a number of cases, minority obstruction was based
not on doubts about the qualifications or sustainability of the nominee, but on a desire to
cripple the officer or agency involved.” Id. at 736.
77
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing recess appointment power). “[F]ive of the
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power allows a President to appoint a member to an agency—which the
Senate was either delaying or would likely not confirm—during a break
in Senate activity.78 As a result, Presidents have used the recess
appointment power 652 times since President Reagan’s administration. 79
Recess appointment power is most important when the NLRB’s
membership declines and the Senate does not agree on the new member
the President nominates for appointment.80 In fact, more than fifty percent
of recess appointments in the past ten years occurred when the Board was

last seven appointments to the NLRB have been recess appointments, as presidents were
unable to achieve Senate confirmation of their choices.” Roberts, supra note 68, at 737.
Around the same time, Senator Richard Shelby stopped all White House nominations for
executive positions when over seventy nominations were pending. THOMAS E. MANN &
NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 85 (2012).
78
See David Frisof, Note, Plausible Absurdities and Practical Formalities: The Recess
Appointments Clause in Theory and Practice, 112 MICH. L. REV. 627, 631 (2014) (asserting that the
President may use recess appointments to appoint members whose terms will end at the end
of the next session). The goal of recess appointments is to ensure that government offices are
able to continue functioning without any interruptions. Roberts, supra note 68, at 744. Critics
have taken issue with the ambiguous language in the recess appointment power, which is
why it is so controversial. Id. at 745.
79
Henry Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., The Noel Canning Decision and Recess
Appointments Made from 1981–2013, at 4 tbl. 1 (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
m020413.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9AQ-PHBE]. When using recess appointment power,
Presidents typically appoint members belonging to their same political party to the NLRB.
Compare Hogue et al., supra note 79, at 5–29 tbl. 2–11 (showing the recess appointments each
president made), and Prints and Photographs Division, Chronological List of Presidents, First
Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html
[http://perma.cc/X7LG-4Y8Z]
(providing a list of the presidents and what years they served), with MEMBERS OF THE NLRB
SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (displaying the political party affiliation of members of the NLRB).
For example, President Reagan’s recess appointments included five Republican members
and one Democrat member while President Obama’s recess appointments included four
Democrat members and one Republican member. Compare Hogue et al., supra note 79, at 5–
12, 27–28 tbl. 2, 3, 10 (reporting President Reagan’s recess appointments), with MEMBERS OF
THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (reviewing the political party affiliation of NLRB
members). No matter which side a particular President favors, the general consensus
regarding partisanship appointment prevents the appointment of a majority of either union
supporters or management supporters. See Roberts, supra note 68, at 737 (explaining the
reasons for appointing a member of one’s own political party).
80
See Roberts, supra note 68, at 737 (noting when the recess appointment power is most
important). For example, President Obama had to use the recess appointment power to
pursue his administration’s labor policies and carry out his statutory abilities when the
NLRB was down to two members for two years prior to his first term of office. Id. See also
Richard D. Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, “Architects of Democracy”: Labor Organizing as a
Civil Right, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 225–26 (2013) (arguing that the NLRB’s structure and
process place it in a vulnerable position to be a target for opponents of workers’ rights).
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on the verge of falling below the necessary three-member quorum.81
Overall, this power is most often used to maintain the needed quorum.82
C. The Quorum Requirement of the NLRB
The NLRB has the power to delegate the authority of deciding cases
to a certain group of members on the Board.83 In 2007, the NLRB used its
own interpretation of this delegation power to its advantage.84 At that
time, the NLRB only had four members and the terms of two of the
members were set to expire, which would cause the NLRB to fall below
the three-member quorum requirement.85 In order to solve the quorum
problem, the NLRB delegated its authority to three members.86 The NLRB
reasoned that when the Board was left with two members, there could be
a quorum because these two members would be a majority of the
delegated three members—of which only two still remained on the

See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (analyzing the members appointed
to the Board by a recess appointment). In the NLRB’s history, Presidents have appointed
twenty-two members using the recess appointment power—seven of which have been in the
past ten years. See id. (displaying all of the members on the NLRB and how they were
appointed).
82
See id. (identifying the number of times the NLRB’s membership has fallen to two or
three members and the number of members who have been recess appointed).
83
See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2012) (giving the NLRB the power to delegate authority). This
part of the enabling statute states:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. The Board
is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under
section 159 of this title to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose
of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and
determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an
election or take a secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 159
of this title and certify the results thereof. . . . A vacancy in the Board
shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the
powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times,
constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall
constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first
sentence hereof.
Id.
84
See Keith et al., supra note 8 (stating that the NLRB used its delegating authority). The
NLRB used its delegation power to get around the three member quorum requirement by
delegating authority to three members and requiring two of those members to vote in favor
for a majority. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (establishing the NLRB’s delegation power).
85
See Keith et al., supra note 8 (explaining why the NLRB delegated its authority).
86
See Matthew D. Moderson, Comment, The National Labor Relations Board After New
Process Steel: The Case for Amending Quorum Requirements Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 80 UMKC L. REV. 463, 470 (2011) (commenting on the delegation of authority to three
members).
81
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Board.87 Many parties began to challenge the NLRB’s decisions because
its enabling statute specified that three members constituted a quorum of
the five-member board.88 It was not until New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB
that these decisions were invalidated.89
In New Process Steel, the NLRB issued two decisions sustaining unfair
labor practice charges against New Process Steel with a two-member
board.90 New Process Steel challenged the decision and argued that the
NLRB did not have enough members to constitute a quorum and that the
delegation of authority was invalid. 91 The Court held that these two
members did not constitute a quorum because they were not a majority of
a delegated group, but the only two members of the group.92
See id. (displaying the reasoning for delegating authority). Moderson states:
Collectively, the Board recognized that a two-member board might not
satisfy the quorum requirements set forth under Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act and thus would lack the authority to
adjudicate labor disputes until the President appointed a replacement
Board member. The Board suggested that such a delay would create
tremendous headaches for employers and unions seeking to resolve
disputes.
Id. The NLRB relied on the statutory language of Section 3(b) of its enabling act and an
opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S.
674, 677 (2010). The NLRB went on to decide 600 cases with just those two members. Keith
et al., supra note 8.
88
See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (displaying the NLRB’s enabling statute).
89
560 U.S. at 688. It is important to note that before this decline in membership, the NLRB
had never lost its quorum for more than two months. See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935,
supra note 11 (showing that the membership had not declined to less than three members for
more than a month until the time of New Process Steel).
90
New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 678. Other employers made the same challenge that New
Process Steel did and some circuits held differently in those cases. See, e.g., Narricot Indus.,
L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 2009) (articulating that a two-member board was
empowered to issue decisions); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 410, 424 (2d Cir.
2009) (deciding that the delegation was not against the NLRB’s enabling statute); Laurel Baye
Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (ruling that
two members did not constitute a valid quorum in order to decide cases); Ne Land Servs.,
Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the NLRB’s delegation to a panel
of two members was lawful under the plain text of the NLRA).
91
New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 678. The Seventh Circuit decided in favor of the NLRB
because they reasoned that “the Taft-Hartley Amendment—which increased the Board’s
membership from three to five members—was to allow the Board to hear more cases” and
therefore, a court should not make an interpretation that was opposite of this. Di Vito, supra
note 21, at 317.
92
New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 687. First, the Court stated that it was undisputed that the
NLRB could delegate its power to a three-member group. Id. at 680. The Court then
interpreted the language of the NLRB’s enabling statute in order to decide whether two of
the three delegated members constituted a quorum. Id. at 680–82. The Court reasoned that
if Congress wanted two members to constitute a quorum, it would have put a provision in
the enabling statute. Id. at 680–83. In addition, the NLRB’s practice has been to require three
members to decide cases. Id. at 683.
87
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New Process Steel caused much panic in the labor world and created
extra work for the NLRB.93 As a result of New Process Steel, around 600
cases could be appealed.94 In an attempt to remedy this, the NLRB issued
a press release that stated all administrative decisions were valid; this
included decisions to add members and ALJs to regional boards. 95 Even
though the press release shielded many cases, the NLRB was still left with
about 100 cases that could be appealed.96
D. NLRB v. Canning
After New Process Steel, the next time the NLRB fell to two members,
President Obama used his recess appointment power to appoint three
members to the NLRB: Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terrence
Flynn.97 President Obama made these recess appointments because the
nominations were pending in the Senate, no action was taken, and the

See Di Vito, supra note 21, at 329 (noting that this decision affected many cases and it
solidified the formalistic approach of the Supreme Court). The decision not only affected
cases decided by the NLRB, but also other courts. Id. Four other circuit courts of appeals
decided this issue and came to the opposite conclusion, thus, the Supreme Court overturned
their rulings. Id.
94
See id. at 329 (stating that almost 600 cases the NLRB decided will be overturned). New
Process Steel will have a greater effect on precedent when administrative agency action is
interpreted in the future. Id. Courts may use this as a model and interpret a statute very
formally which could take away certain powers from administrative agencies. Id.
95
See Office of Public Affairs, New Board Ratifies the General Counsel’s Litigation Authority
in 2008-09. Also Ratifies Administrative and Personnel Actions From that Period, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (July 8, 2010), http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d4580380dec [http://perma.cc/QY2-4W49] (determining that all administrative and
personnel decisions are unilaterally ratified). In addition, the press release stated that the
general counsel decisions were not affected. Id. See also Office of Public Affairs, NLRB
Outlines Plans for Considering 2-Member Cases in Wake of Supreme Court Ruling, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (July 1, 2010), http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.
aspx/09031d458037e114 [http://perma.cc/5QC5-M88H] (explaining how the NLRB will
handle the appealed cases).
96
See Susan J. McGolrick, Board Seeking Remand of About 96 Cases Challenging Validity of
Two-Member Rulings, 79 U.S.L.W. 1000, 1030 (2010) (stating that each remanded case will be
considered by a three member panel). The NLRB reviewed some of those decisions, which
took away time from its current operations, but most of the case decisions stayed the same.
See Amanda Becker, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Seen Unlikely to Alter Past NLRB Decisions,
THOMSON REUTERS (June 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-usacourts-appointments-nlrb-idUSKBN0F12J820140626 [http://perma.cc/MLP8-YX2F] (‘‘In
most cases, the new decisions and old decisions were the same, but that wasn’t the case in
every single case . . . .”).
97
See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014) (displaying the facts, which led up to
the Canning dispute).
93
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NLRB was about to lose its quorum.98 At the time President Obama made
these appointments, the Senate was only meeting for pro forma sessions.99
Noel Canning was one of the many decisions decided by the NLRB
with the three members President Obama appointed during the Senate’s
pro forma session in 2013.100 The NLRB did not find in favor of Noel
Canning and ordered them to make their employees whole for any
losses.101 Noel Canning requested that the Court of Appeals and the
District of Columbia Circuit Court set their orders aside, claiming that
three of the current NLRB members were invalidly appointed.102
The issue in this case was whether the January 3–6 pro forma sessions
the Senate held were enough to consider the Senate to be in session. 103 The
Supreme Court analyzed the language of the Recess Appointments
Clause, and a nine Justice plurality concluded President Obama’s recess
98
See 159 CONG. REC. S16 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013) (Nominations Returned to the President)
(showing that Senate members were not confirming nominations to the NLRB).
99
Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 246 (discussing the
actions taken by President Obama which led up to the NLRB v. Canning dispute). Pro forma
sessions are brief meetings of the Senate; sometimes only lasting a few minutes. UNITED
STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/pro_forma_session.
htm [https://perma.cc/3UX6-VA5D]. The NLRB then went on to make approximately 800
decisions with these members. See Lawrence E. Dubé, Justices Reject NLRB Recess
Appointments and Mark Constraints on Presidential Power, BNA: DAILY LABOR REPORT (June 27,
2014), http://www.bna.com/justices-reject-nlrb-n17179891622/ [http://perma.cc/XQQ54F5N] (stating that the invalidated Board decided about 300 unpublished decisions and 500
published decisions).
100
See Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Feb. 8, 2012) (articulating that the NLRB did not
find in favor of Noel Canning). The NLRB “found that a Pepsi-Cola distributor, Noel
Canning, had unlawfully refused to reduce to writing and execute a collective-bargaining
agreement with a labor union.” Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
101
Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557. The court also ordered Noel Canning to execute a collectivebargaining agreement with its employees. Id.
102
Id. Noel Canning’s view was that the Senate meeting on January 3, 2013, terminated
the recess of the Senate. Id. The Court of Appeals ruled that almost all recess appointments
were invalid. See Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that Obama’s
recess appointments were invalid). The Court of Appeals said that the recess appointment
must be made within the same intersession recess when the vacancy for that office arose. Id.
at 514.
103
See UNITED STATES SENATE, supra note 99 (defining a pro forma session as a brief meeting
of the Senate). At some of these sessions the Senate would only bang the gavel and then
adjourn. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Sometimes a Day in Congress Takes Seconds, Gavel to Gavel,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/politics/
06congress.html [http://perma.cc/364B-LHZH] (stating that a meeting of the Senate lasted
fifty-nine seconds). Critics argue that these pro forma sessions were scheduled for the
purpose of preventing President Obama from recess appointing members. See Alexander
Bolton, Senate Schedules Pro-forma Sessions to Block Obama’s Appointments, THE HILL (Dec. 12,
2011), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/200121-senate-schedules-pro-forma-sessionsto-block-obamas-recess-appointments [http://perma.cc/AA9K-BH4N] (criticizing that the
Senate was only trying to block appointments and was not conducting any business).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 8

290

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

appointments were invalid.104 However, the Court’s reasoning was much
broader than that of the Court of Appeals. 105 The Court determined that
the length of recess was the most relevant factor in whether the Recess
Appointments Clause was activated.106 Finally, the Court stated that the
Senate decides when it is in session as long as it has the capacity to act.107
Some scholars and critics observed this opinion to be a
“[c]onstitutional [c]risis” because it “unanimously limited the president’s
power to make temporary recess appointments when the Senate is not in
session.”108 However, there is also an argument that the Court could have
limited the recess appointment power more than it chose to.109 In
addition, those who were in favor of the Senate thought the regulation
was much needed.110
104
See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (concluding that the Senate needed to have a recess for at
least ten days in order for the recess appointments to be valid).
105
See id. at 2567 (upholding recess appointment power, but limiting its use by various
requirements); Charlie Savage, Between the Lines of the Recess Appointments Decision, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/25/us/annotatedsupreme-court-recess-decision.html [http://perma.cc/D5J5-DFEA] (“While on the surface
the ruling was a blow to executive power, on a deeper level it was also a victory for executive
power because it rolled back an appeals court ruling that had gone much further in
restricting such authority.”).
106
See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567 (“If a Senate recess is so short that it does not require the
consent of the House, it is too short to trigger the Recess Appointments Clause . . . [a]nd a
recess lasting less than 10 days is presumptively too short as well.”). In addition, the
Supreme Court interpreted the language “all vacancies” in the Recess Appointments Clause
to include both vacancies that occur during a recess of the Senate and those that occur while
the Senate is in session. Id. at 2573. By broadly interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause,
the Court chose not to distinguish between intersession recess appointments and
intrasession recess appointments because they stated that “the recess” applied to both. Id. at
2567.
107
See id. at 2574 (leading to the conclusion that the pro forma sessions signified the Senate
being in session). In addition to the majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote a concurring
opinion in which he argued that the Recess Appointments Clause only applied to breaks in
between sessions. Id. at 2595 (Scalia, J., concurring). He also argued that the Recess
Appointments Clause only applied to vacancies, which happen while the Senate is in recess.
Id. at 2617. All in all, Scalia stated that the majority “replaces the Constitution’s text with a
new set of judge-made rules to govern recess appointments.” Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2617.
108
Pema Levy, Did the Supreme Court Just Set Up a Constitutional Crisis?, NEWSWEEK (June
27, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/did-supreme-court-just-set-constitutional-crisis256461 [http://perma.cc/TX9J-A9U8]. If the President does not control both houses of
Congress he might not be able to make appointments. Id. See also Jeff Shesol, Did History
NEW
YORKER
(June
26,
2014),
Win
in
Noel
Canning,
THE
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/06/supreme-court-recessappointments-power-noel-canning.html [http://perma.cc/PW9K-ECF6] (arguing that this
provision gives the Senate the power to avoid confirming presidential appointments
indefinitely).
109
See Savage, supra note 105 (stating that the Supreme Court “rolled back” on how far the
Court of Appeals had gone).
110
See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Court Ruling Upsets Conventional Wisdom On Recess
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Many critics also realized that this decision could invalidate an
abundance of cases.111 Some critics argued that every case needed to be
reanalyzed, while others argued that it is likely the NLRB will rubber
stamp them resulting in no major policy changes.112 Regardless of the side
the critics supported, everyone maintained that the decision created a lot
of work for the NLRB because the agency would need to reanalyze cases
and make up for the time when the Board did not have a quorum.113
E. The Aftermath of NLRB v. Canning
After the invalidation of President Obama’s recess appointments, the
Court required those members to vacate the Board.114 This decision left
three open positions on the NLRB. 115 On July 30, 2013, the Senate
confirmed a new board that included two old members and three new
members.116 Each of these members have varying experiences and
Appointments, NPR (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/25/
170293179/court-ruling-upsets-conventional-wisdom-on-recess-appointments
[http://perma.cc/VNL6-Y8JJ] (“Allowing the President to define the scope of his own
appointments power would eviscerate the Constitution’s separation of powers . . . .”)
(internal quotations omitted).
111
See Keith et al., supra note 8 (commenting that all Board decisions between January 2012
and August 2013 are void); see also Dubé, supra note 99 (demonstrating that the impact of
NLRB v. Canning will be significant); G. Roger King & Bryan J. Leitch, The Impact of the
Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision—Years of Litigation Challenges on the Horizon for the
NLRB, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 27, 2014), http://www.bna.com/impact-supreme-courtsn17179891624 [http://perma.cc/QHT4-58AH] (explaining the amount of cases which could
be overturned both on the regional and national level).
112
Compare Labor Board Scrambles After Hundreds of Decisions Thrown into Doubt By Court
Ruling, FOX NEWS (June 27, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/27/laborboard-scrambles-after-hundreds-decisions-thrown-into-doubt-by-court/
[http://perma.cc/GP6-EKNU] (arguing that each case needs to be presented before the
Board), with Dubé, supra note 99 (stating that some parties might not even appeal).
113
See Keith et al., supra note 8 (discussing the amount of decisions the board might have
to reexamine); see also Dubé, supra note 99 (articulating that the NLRB has a large amount of
cases to reconsider); King & Leitch, supra note 111 (analyzing that the resolving of these cases
could take years).
114
See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) (holding that the Recess
Appointments Clause did not give President Obama the constitutional authority to make the
appointments at issue); see also Mark L. Shapiro et al., United States: The Supreme Court’s Noel
Canning Decisions and the NLRB’s Response, MONDAQ (July 17, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/328048/employee+rights+labour+relations/Th
e+Supreme+Courts+Noel+Canning+Decision+and+the+NLRBs+Response
[http://perma.cc/6U6P-B7MH] (advocating that the NLRB needs to act fast on the cases in
order to make room for new issues).
115
See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (showing how many members
were on the Board at a time).
116
Harold P. Coxson, Senate Confirms New Five-Member NLRB: What Just Happened and
What’s Next?, OGLETREE DEAKINS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/senateconfirms-new-five-member-nlrb-what-just-happened-and-whats-next/ [http://perma.cc/
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political views that play a role in the way the NLRB makes decisions.117
The views of the members are important because the NLRB has two
different sides it could take in almost every case—the employee or the
management.118 These members’ terms will end at varying times starting
in December 2014; this will be significant because the difference in party
alignment during the next term could create a gridlock.119 In addition,
while the new NLRB was trying to patch the damage from NLRB v.
Canning, the Senate was constructing a new enabling statute for the
NLRB.120 In general, this new board, consisting of three Democrats—one
576H-SDPR]. The two members who were not invalidated were: Mark Gaston Pearce and
Philip A. Miscimarra. Id. Mark Pearce has been the chairman of the NLRB since August 27,
2011. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD: MARK GASTON PEARCE,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/mark-gaston-pearce [http://perma.cc/4Q3MK8VJ]. Prior to being on the Board, he was a founding partner at a law firm in Buffalo, New
York where he practiced union and plaintiff side labor and employment law. Id. Philip A.
Miscimarra became a Board member on August 7, 2013. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, THE BOARD:
PHILIP A. MISCIMARRA, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/philip-miscimarra [http://perma.cc/3TWW-N9H9]. Prior to being a NLRB
member, he was a labor and employment law partner at a Chicago law firm. Id. He wrote
many books on labor law issues, including some on the NLRB. Id.
117
See Coxson, supra note 116 (summarizing the positions of the board members). The
Senate confirmed three new members to the Board on July 30, 2013: Nancy Schiffer, Harry
I. Johnson, III, and Kent Hirozawa. Id. Nancy Schiffer is a Democrat who was previously
the associate general counsel with the AFL-CIO. Id. She has been involved in all aspects of
NLRA practice and procedure and has even been a part of the NLRB previously as a field
attorney at the Detroit Regional Office. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD:
NANCY
J.
SCHIFFER,
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/nancy-j-schiffer
[http://perma.cc/6K6E-9THR]. Next, Harry I. Johnson, III is a Republican who previously
practiced at a management-side law firm in Los Angeles. See Coxson, supra note 116
(describing Mr. Johnson’s previous positions). He previously worked at Jones Day for a
sixteen year period. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD: HARRY I. JOHNSON,
III, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/harry-i-johnson-iii
[http://perma.cc/
NZ43-S7J6]. Last, Kent Hirozawa, prior to being appointed to the Board, was chief counsel
to Board Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce. Coxson, supra note 116. Before this, he worked as
a union lawyer for most of his career at a New York law firm. Id.; NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD: KENT Y. HIROZAWA, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/kent-y-hirozawa [http://perma.cc/H6MB-U9XS].
118
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 72–76 (stating that one side must be
chosen and critics of one side will probably disagree). Union and workers’ rights supporters
typically take the employee’s side. Id. Upper level management and executives typically
take the management’s side. Id.
119
See Scott Flaherty, With Election Win, GOP To Push Legislation To Rein In NLRB, LAW360
(Nov. 5, 2014, 12:52 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/590910/with-election-win-gopto-push-legislation-to-rein-in-nlrb [http://perma.cc/S6XZ-37QV] (opining that Republicans
may have the votes to block nominees); see also Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (“There is also
the political question of what happens next time there is a vacancy on the board and opposite
parties control the White House and the Senate.”).
120
See infra Part II.E.2 (explaining the Senate’s proposed bill to reform the NLRB’s enabling
statute).
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of them being the chair of the board—and two Republicans, had a
significant amount of work to do to get the NLRB caught up on
everything.121
The NLRB’s actions can be split into two parts: the NLRB’s Reaction,
and the Senate’s Proposed Bill.122 Part II.E.1 discusses the NLRB’s action
thus far.123 Part II.E.2 introduces the Senate’s new proposed bill and all of
the provisions that pertain to the national office of the NLRB, including a
new funding requirement.124
1.

The NLRB’s Reaction

The new board reacted quickly after the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in NLRB v. Canning.125 In less than a month after the Court issued
its decision, the NLRB delivered a press release confirming all regional
appointments and regional decisions.126 In addition, the President and
See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, BOARD MEMBERS SINCE 1935,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 [http://perma.cc/Z3EVL9UK] (displaying the makeup of members to the NLRB and their political affiliation); see
also Dubé, supra note 99 (arguing that these cases will have a big impact on the NLRB’s
operation); King & Leitch, supra note 111 (commenting on the amount of cases the NLRB
may have to reexamine); Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (explaining that many high profile and
controversial decisions were invalidated). The trust in the NLRB was also at issue because
many cases could be appealed. See William McQuillen, NLRB Chief Says Lapses By Flynn Raise
Questions of Trust, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0503/nrlb-chief-says-lapses-by-flynn-raise-questions-of-trust.html [http://perma.cc/NRL6HNLF] (noting that there have been questions of trust in the NLRB).
122
See infra Part II.E.1 (showing the NLRB’s action since NLRB v. Canning); see also infra
Part II.E.2 (explaining the Senate’s proposed bill).
123
See infra Part II.E.1 (reviewing the NLRB’s actions thus far).
124
See infra Part II.E.2 (outlining each section of the Senate’s bill).
125
NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014). See Benjamin Goad, NLRB Ratifies Actions
of Unconstitutional Board, THE HILL (Aug. 8, 2014), http://thehill.com/regulation/labor/
214239-nlrb-ratifies-actions-taken-by-unconstitutional-labor-board [http://perma.cc/R94838TJ] (repeating the NLRB’s message from its press release). Because of the press release,
the NLRB will have fewer issues that could possibly be reexamined. Id.
126
See Office of Public Affairs, NLRB Officials Ratify Agency Actions Taken During Period
When Supreme Court Held Board Members Were Not Validly Appointed, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbofficials-ratify-agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court
[http://perma.
cc/XP83-FMCS] (stating that the NLRB “unanimously ratified all administrative, personnel,
and procurement matters taken by the NLRB from January 4, 2012 to August 5, 2013”). This
press release allowed the NLRB to ensure that actions taken by the regional members
appointed during the time of invalidation could not be appealed. See Barbara E. Hoey &
Mark A. Konkel, NLRB Ratifies All Administrative Actions Taken by the Board During “Noel
Canning” Period, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=f2680f40-69d1-4254-b694-d49682f99c2e [http://perma.cc/JCW8-TYXK] (referring to
the appointment of three regional directors, many ALJs, and the restructuring of offices and
departments). The time of invalidation refers to the time when the invalidated members
121
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Senate agreed on who replaced Nancy Schiffer when her term was up in
December 2014.127 Confirming these officials’ actions and appointing a
replacement for Schiffer were only two of the many tasks the NLRB
checked off its list.128
Although the new board avoided reexamination of many regional
cases because of the press release confirming all regional directors, there
are still around 100 cases the NLRB may be required to revisit with the
new valid members.129 In order for these cases to be re-decided, one of the
parties has to request an appeal from a U.S. Court of Appeals. 130
Specifically, seven cases that may be appealed would have a large effect
on labor and employment law.131 If the rulings of these cases change, it
were a part of the Board.
127
See Ramsey Cox, Senate Dems Confirm NLRB Nominee Before GOP Take Over, THE HILL
BLOG (Dec. 8, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/226369-senatedems-confirm-nlrb-nominee-before-gop-take-over
[http://perma.cc/SST6-XY58]
[hereinafter Cox, Senate Dems Confirm] (stating that Lauren McGarity McFerran was
confirmed by a 54–40 vote in the Senate). McFerran was a former member of the Senate
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and “will be a great asset to the board.”
Id. This was an important advancement for the NLRB because without a replacement for
Schiffer, there would have been a two-two split between Republican and Democrat
members. See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (displaying the makeup of
members to the NLRB and their political affiliation); see also Carolyn Phenicie, GOP Strategy
on Labor Issues Remains Hazy, ROLL CALL (Dec. 3, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/
news/gop_strategy_on_labor_issues_remains_hazy-238378-1.html
[http://perma.cc/
Y28U-69XV] (recognizing that even numbers of Republicans and Democrats can cause
gridlock).
128
Benjamin Goad, Workload Threatens to Paralyze Labor Board, THE HILL (July 13, 2014),
http://thehill.com/regulation/labor/212031-new-workload-threatens-to-paralyze-obamalabor-board [http://perma.cc/C24F-S788]. If the NLRB had not ratified the appointment of
all of these regional directors and ALJs, the new board would have had hundreds of cases to
reexamine because it would not only need to reexamine the cases the national board decided,
but also would have to tend to the regional cases that never reached the national level. See
id. (“[T]he ruling could throw into question more than 400 cases from the period between
January 2012, when the appointments were made, and August 2013, when the Senate
approved new board members.”). In addition to cases being re-decided, there are new cases
which caused more media attention to be focused on the NLRB. See Kate Taylor, Franchise
Industry Strikes Back at NLRB’s “Joint Employer” Decision, ENTREPRENEUR BLOG (Sept. 23,
2014),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237759
[http://perma.cc/K62A-2F8J]
(mentioning that some cases the NLRB is deciding will have great economic effect); Erik
Wemple, NLRB Rules Against CNN Over 2003 Reorganization, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2014/09/15/nlrb-rulesagainst-cnn-over-2003-reorganization/ [http://perma.cc/LRA5-CSAP] (focusing attention
on the NLRB’s recent decisions).
129
See Hoey & Konkel, supra note 126 (stating that the NLRB will still have to revisit the
100 cases which were invalidated).
130
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012) (explaining the appeals process of a final order from the
NLRB).
131
See Jeffrey D. Polsky, United States: 9 Key NLRB Decisions Invalidated by the Supreme
Court’s Noel Canning Decision, MONDAQ (July 1, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/
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would drastically affect how employees, employers, and unions operate
on a daily basis.132 These seven cases can be separated into three different
categories: (1) employee policy; (2) union representation; and (3) old
precedent.133
The employee policy category is comprised of three cases prohibiting
employee discussion in some manner.134 Employee policy governs what
unitedstates/x/324276/employee+rights+labour+relations/9+Key+NLRB+Decisions+Inva
lidated+by+the+Supreme+Courts+Noel+Canning+Decision [http://perma.cc/TF9-X53S]
(summarizing nine cases that are important to track in the upcoming months). This Note
addresses seven of the nine cases that fit into the three specific categories.
132
See infra Part III.A (showing what changes would occur if these cases are appealed).
133
See Polsky, supra note 131 (considering certain cases that would have a greater impact
than most other cases). Employee policy is comprised of Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc.
and Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Costco Wholesale Corporation. Hispanics United of Buffalo,
Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *4 (Dec. 14, 2012); Fresenius
USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19, 2012);
Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *16
(Sept. 7, 2012). Union representation is comprised of Alan Ritchey, Inc. and Banner Health
System. Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10
(Dec. 14, 2012); Banner Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2
(July 30, 2012). Old precedent is comprised of Piedmont Gardens and WKTC-TV, Inc.
Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15,
2012); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *8 (Dec. 12,
2012).
134
See Polsky, supra note 131 (displaying the synopsis of the seven cases); see also NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/employee-rights [http://perma.cc/K5PH-48KH] (describing the employee rights
that the NLRB protects). Cases that fit into this category include Hispanics United of Buffalo,
Inc., Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc., and Costco Wholesale Corporation. See Hispanics
United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *1–2, 4
(Dec. 14, 2012) (discussing that discharging employees for Facebook comments written in
response to a coworker’s criticisms of their job performance violated the NLRA); see also
Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19,
2012) (asserting that an employee may not be suspended and discharged for posting vulgar,
offensive, and possibly threatening statements on union newsletters and leaving them in the
breakroom); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶
15602 at *16 (Sept. 7, 2012) (holding that Costco violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by
maintaining rules prohibiting posting, distributing, removing, or altering materials on
company property, prohibiting discussing private matters of others including sick calls,
Family and Medical Leave Act call-outs, Americans with Disabilities Act accommodations,
sensitive information such as payroll, and confidential information such as phone numbers
and addresses).
In Hispanics United of Buffalo, an employee posted a discriminatory statement about
another employee on Facebook and four other employees commented on it. Hispanics
United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *1–2 (Dec.
14, 2012). Hispanics United of Buffalo discharged all five employees for this act. Id. at *2.
The NLRB ruled that discharging the employees was a violation of the NLRA because the
criticisms were undertaken for “mutual aid or protection” as required by Section 7 of the
NLRA, which meant it was concerted activity. Id.
In Fresenius USA Manufacturing, female employees complained about vulgar, offensive,
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an employee can and cannot do.135 These three cases deal with employees
who made comments about an employer, another employee, or union. 136
This type of activity is important for employees to be able to organize and
express their opinions by utilizing protected concerted activity.137 The risk
in this category of cases being reexamined is that change could cause
employees’ jobs to be in jeopardy and unfair labor standards to be
imposed.138
Next, the union representation category involves cases that discuss
the rights of the collective bargaining agreements. 139 Union representation
and threatening statements on union newsletters. Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138,
2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *1–2 (Sept. 19, 2012). Fresenius investigated the
statements, questioned the employee, and as a result of the confirmation of the employee
being responsible, suspended and discharged that employee. Id. The NLRB ruled that the
questioning and investigation was proper, but that the suspension and discharge was not
because his comments were classified as protected union activity. Id. at *8.
In Costco Wholesale Corporation, an employee of Costco attempted to get others to
unionize by passing out material and discussing it with other employees. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *6 (Sept. 7, 2012). The
NLRB ruled this to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA and ordered Costco to cease
and desist from this activity and reform its employee agreement. Id. at *16–17.
135
See Polsky, supra note 131 (displaying the seven cases analyzed); see also supra note 134
and accompanying text (analyzing the employee policy category). In all of these cases, the
NLRB decided in favor of the employee. Supra note 134 and accompanying text.
136
See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶
15656 at *1–2 (Dec. 14, 2012) (discharging employees for making comments online about
another worker); see also Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 15622 at *1–2, 8 (Sept. 19, 2012) (analyzing whether an employee writing comments
on a newsletter can be disciplined); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *6 (Sept. 7, 2012) (discussing an employee making comments
about a union).
137
See NLRB, Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 2–5, http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node3024/basicguide.pdf [http://perma.cc/HPP4-AXHQ] [hereinafter Basic Guide] (explaining
Section 7 of the NLRA regarding concerted activity). See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN,
supra note 30, at 16–20 (describing the NLRA and its purpose). “A better relationship
between labor and management is the high purpose of this act. By assuring the employees
the right of collective bargaining it fosters the development of the employment contract on a
sound and equitable basis.” Id.
138
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (showing the facts of each case and explaining
the consequence to employees and employers). In fact, on June 24, 2015, the NLRB
considered de novo the invalidated decision of Fresenius USA Manufacturing, and it found that
the investigation, suspension, and discharge were all lawful. Fresenius USA Mfg., 362
N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *2−3 (June 24, 2015). This is contrary to the NLRB’s
first decision in Fresenius USA Manufacturing where it stated the suspension and discharge
of the employee was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA. Fresenius USA Mfg.,
358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19, 2012).
139
See Polsky, supra note 131 (displaying the synopsis of the seven cases). The cases in this
category consist of Alan Ritchey, Inc. and Banner Health System. See Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359
N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10 (Dec. 14, 2012) (ruling that
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allows employees to organize and protect their rights.140 Section 8 of the
NLRA addresses collective bargaining and the representation of
employees, which is important because, without it, employers could
unduly influence employees by making agreements that are favorable to
the employer.141 These cases represent the right of an employee to receive
the aid of a union prior to being discharged. 142 If either of these decisions
are changed on reexamination, employees would be wary about
consulting unions during investigations that would endanger their
employment rights.143 In addition, employers might put less effort into
investigations if they knew they could discharge employees without
questioning from a union.144 Overall, this loophole could defeat the
essence of the collective bargaining agreement.145
Finally the last category, old precedent, deals with cases which
overturn longstanding labor and employment law precedent. 146 Old
discretionary discipline is a mandatory subject of bargaining and that employers may not
impose discipline unilaterally); Banner Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2 (July 30, 2012) (holding that a rule that an employee could not discuss
ongoing investigations of employee misconduct was against Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA).
In Alan Ritchey, Inc., two employees with nine unexcused absences were each given
verbal warnings and a written warning. Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *3 (Dec. 14, 2012). The company evaluated each situation and
discharged what it believed to be the appropriate employees. Id. The NLRB examined the
policy and ruled that the company should have contacted the union before it imposed any
discretionary discipline even though the parties had not signed their contract with the union
yet. Id. at *10. In Banner Health, the human resources director disciplined the employee and
asked the employee not to discuss the matter with coworkers during the ongoing
investigation. Banner Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *1
(July 30, 2012). The NLRB held that this was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
because the employer did not show that it had a legitimate interest that outweighed the
employee’s Section 7 rights. Id. at *2.
140
See Chris Langford, Why Collective Bargaining Rights are Important, INT’L FEDERATION OF
PROF’L & TECHNICAL ENG’RS (June 13, 2012), http://www.ifpte.org/news/details/WhyCollective-Bargaining-Rights-Are-Important [http://perma.cc/J57R-8VMS] (explaining the
importance of union representation).
141
See Basic Guide, supra note 137, at 6–13 (discussing the requirements of collective
bargaining).
142
See Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10
(Dec. 14, 2012) (regarding consulting a union prior to discretionary discipline); Banner
Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2 (July 30, 2012) (allowing
an employee to discuss an ongoing investigation).
143
See Basic Guide, supra note 137, at 6–13 (explaining the rights of employees to have a
relationship with a union). In fact, on June 26, 2015, the NLRB affirmed the previous vacated
opinion in Banner Health. Banner Health, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 2015 WL 4179691, at *1 (June
26, 2015).
144
See supra Part II.A (describing the history of the NLRA and why it was created).
145
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (guaranteeing employees the right to collectively bargain).
146
See Polsky, supra note 131 (depicting the cases which could affect old precedent). Two
important decisions in this category are Piedmont Gardens and WKTC-TV, Inc. See Piedmont
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precedent provides employers, employees, and unions a guide for future
policies and disputes.147 Specifically, both of the cases in this category
involve union representation and an employer making a decision without
union consultation.148 If these rulings changed on reexamination,
employers would believe that they could consult the union less in
decisionmaking.149 Old precedent cases are important because they serve
as reminders that the NLRA created the NLRB and the NLRA must be
Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15, 2012)
(overruling a fifty-five year precedent and stating that an employer violated the NLRA by
failing to provide the witnesses’ names and job titles); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30,
2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *8 (Dec. 12, 2012) (overruling an old precedent and
stating that an employer, at the expiration of a union contract, must continue to honor a dues
checkoff arrangement until the employee and employer can reach an agreement or a valid
“impasse” permits unilateral modification by the employer).
In Piedmont Gardens, a nurse observed another nurse sleeping on the job, but the nurse
who observed the conduct did not report it; an assistant reported it. Piedmont Gardens, 359
N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *1–2 (Dec. 15, 2012). After the
observing nurse found out that someone else reported the incident, she wrote a statement
reporting the conduct. Id. at *2. After, both the observing nurse and the assistant were asked
to compile another statement of the incident and after examining the statements, the sleeping
nurse was fired. Id. The union requested the documents in the investigation, but the
employer refused to turn them over. Id. The NLRB held that when the union asked for the
statements, the employer was required to turn them over because not turning them over
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA. Id. at *5–6.
In WKTC-TV, Inc., the employee and employer were parties to multiple collective
bargaining agreements. WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶
15653 at *1 (Dec. 12, 2012). In the most recent collective bargaining agreement there was a
“dues checkoff[,]” which is when the employer takes the union dues out of a paycheck
automatically. Id. at *1–2. The current agreement ended and a new agreement was being
negotiated. Id. In the meantime, the employer stopped collecting the dues without
consulting the union. Id. The NLRB ruled this action to be against Section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA and that the employer should have honored the dues checkoff arrangements postcontract expiration. Id. at *8.
147
See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987) (explaining the
importance of precedent). Schauer opined that:
An argument from precedent seems at first to look backward. The
traditional perspective on precedent . . . has therefore focused on the use
of yesterday’s precedents in today’s decisions. But in an equally if not
more important way, an argument from precedent looks forward as
well, asking us to view today’s decision as a precedent for tomorrow’s
decisionmakers. Today is not only yesterday’s tomorrow; it is also
tomorrow’s yesterday.
Id.
148
Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec.
15, 2012); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *2 (Dec.
12, 2012). If these cases are appealed, union membership could decline and more employees
could be fired without just cause. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing the
facts of each case).
149
See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (explaining that never consulting with a union can be an unfair
labor practice).
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followed.150 Overall, the three categories of cases encompass some of the
most important issues in the realm of labor and employment law.151
2.

The Senate’s Proposed Bill

The Senate suggested its own solution to the NLRB’s problems. 152 On
September 16, 2014, the Republican leaders in the Senate proposed a bill
to amend the NLRA to reform the NLRB. 153 The bill, which is called the
National Labor Relations Board Reform Act (“the Bill”), proposes a new
structure, appointment procedure, and requirements for both a quorum
and funding.154
The new structure the Bill proposes is to change the Board to sixmembers with three Democrats and three Republicans.155 These members
150
See Basic Guide, supra note 137, at 6–13 (showing the requirements an employer must
follow). In fact, on June 26, 2015, the NLRB affirmed the previous vacated opinion in
Piedmont Gardens. Piedmont Gardens, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 2015 WL 4179692, at *8 (June 26,
2015).
151
See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (displaying the unfair labor practices).
152
See Brian Mahoney, GOP Senators Unveil National Labor Relations Board Overhaul,
POLITICO (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/national-laborrelations-board-members-111010.html [http://perma.cc/N42A-UMLB] (asserting that the
NLRB Reform Act will “change the NLRB from an advocate to an umpire”); see also Ramsey
Cox, McConnell Pushes NLRB Reforms, THE HILL BLOG (Sept. 16, 2014, 10:45 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/217832-mcconnell-pushes-nlrb-reforms
[http://perma.cc/4NHD-NVKU] (providing that this would “take the politics out of it”).
But see Thomas E. Mann, Admit It, Political Scientists: Politics Really Is More Broken Than Ever,
THE ATLANTIC (May 26, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/
dysfunction/371544/ [http://perma.cc/9FTG-9K4L] (reporting that politics are more
broken than ever and everything is becoming dysfunctional); see also Aaron Blake, Gridlock
in Congress? It’s Probably Even Worse Than You Think, WASH. POST (May 29, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/gridlock-in-congressits-probably-even-worse-than-you-think/ [http://perma.cc/3VAC-NLXA] (explaining that
gridlock has more than doubled since the 1950s).
153
S. 2814, 113th Cong. (2014). See Eleanor Vaida Gerhards, United States: In Wake of
McDonald’s, GOP Senate Proposes Bill to Restructure National Labor Relations Board, MONDAQ
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/341246/employee+rights+
labour+relations/In+Wake+of+McDonalds+GOP+Senate+Proposes+Bill+to+Restructure+
National+Labor+Relations+Board [http://perma.cc/P3QJ-GCND] (discussing the Senate’s
proposed new structure to the NLRB).
154
S. 2814, 113th Cong. The bill is modeled off of the Federal Election Commission, which
is known to be one of the most ineffective independent agencies. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)–
(2)(B) (2012) (reviewing the Federal Election Commission’s structure); Michael M. Franz, The
Devil We Know? Evaluating the Federal Election Commission as Enforcer, 8 ELECTION L.J. 167, 167
(2009) (stating that the Federal Election Commission is one of the most ineffective agencies
and Congress designed it to be slow and ineffective).
155
S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a). This section states that it will amend 29 U.S.C. § 153(a):
[B]y striking “five instead of three members” and inserting “6 instead of
5 members”; and . . . by striking “appointed by the President by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate” and inserting “appointed
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would be “appointed by the President, after consultation with the leader
of the Senate representing the party opposing the party of the President,
by and with the consent of the Senate.”156 In addition, two members’
terms would end at the same time, one being Republican and the other
being Democrat.157
One of those
Next, the Bill proposes new requirements.158
requirements is to change the quorum requirement from three to four
members.159 In addition, there must be a balance of Republicans and
Democrats in the quorum, which means there has to be at least two
Republicans and two Democrats in favor of the holding in each case. 160
The other new requirements address funding of the NLRB.161 First, there
by the President, after consultation with the leader of the Senate
representing the party opposing the party of the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate . . . .”
Id. § 2(a)(1)(B)–(C). It also adds that “[o]f the 6 members, there shall be 3 members
representing each of the 2 major political parties . . . .]” Id. § 2(a)(2).
156
Id. § 2(a)(1)(C).
157
See id. § 2(a)(2) (requiring two members of opposite political parties to have terms
ending on the same date).
158
See id. § 2 (establishing new requirements for the NLRB).
159
S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(b). This section amends 29 U.S.C. § 153(b):
[B]y striking “three or more” and inserting “4 or more”; . . . by inserting
before the period following: “, with such group consisting of an equal
number of members representing each major political party”; . . . by
striking “three members” and inserting “4 members”; and . . . by
striking “Board, except that” and all that follows through “hereof.” And
inserting the following: “Board. Any determination of the Board shall
be approved by majority of the members present.”
Id. § 2(b)(1).
160
See id. § 2(b)(1)(B) (commenting that a quorum shall consist of “an equal number of
members representing each major political party”). This means that two members will have
to vote against party lines to make a decision. See Dave Jamieson, Republican Proposal for
Labor Law Reform “A Disgrace,” Says Labor Leader, HUFF. POST (Sept. 18, 2014, 11:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/labor-law-reform_n_5838922.html
[http://perma.cc/57H2-6K3U] (discussing that there must be an even amount of political
parties to have a vote).
161
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20 (creating funding requirements for the NLRB). This section
would add the following to 29 U.S.C. § 153:
If, 2 years after the date of the enactment the National Labor Relations
Board Reform Act, the Board has failed to issue a final order, in
accordance with section 10(d), on more than 90 percent of the cases
pending on (or filed on or after) such date of enactment, then the amount
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act for each of the
succeeding 2 fiscal years shall be 80 percent of the average amount so
authorized for the prior 2 fiscal years. . . . If, 4 years after the date of the
enactment of the National Labor Relations Board Reform Act, the Board
has failed to issue a final order, in accordance with section 10(d), on
more than 90 percent of the cases pending on (or filed on or after) the
date that is 2 years after the date of such enactment, then the amount
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is a two-year deadline that proposes within the first two years after the
Bill’s enactment if the NLRB fails to come to a final order in ninety percent
or more of its cases, the NLRB will lose twenty percent of its funding.162
Next, there is a four-year deadline that lengthens the two-year
requirement.163 The Bill states that if the NLRB has not decided ninety
percent or more of its cases within the first four years of the Bill’s
enactment, then the NLRB shall keep the twenty percent budget reduction
for each succeeding year.164 Overall, the Bill could change the NLRB’s
entire structure.165
F.

The Federal Communications Commission

If the NLRB changes its structure or enabling statute in the future, it
could use other independent agencies as a guide.166 Many other
independent agencies have similar structures to the NLRB, such as the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).167 The FCC is similar to
the NLRB in the way that it operates.168
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act for each succeeding
fiscal year shall remain the amount so appropriated for the fiscal year
that is 4 years after the date of such enactment.
Id. § 20(a)–(b).
162
Id. § 20(a). There was a house bill in 2011, which also called for a funding decrease, but
the bill did not pass. See H.R. 1, 112th Cong. (2011) (asking for an eighteen percent decrease
in the NLRB’s budget); see also Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 225−26 n.67 (describing
two House bills that attempted to decrease the funding of the NLRB).
163
S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a)–(b).
164
Id.
165
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the Senate’s bill).
166
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (allowing Commodity Future’s Trading Commission
members to continue their term until another member is appointed); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)
(permitting a Federal Trade Commission member’s term to extend until another member is
appointed); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(b) (2012) (establishing that a Consumer Product Safety
Commission member’s term may extend until another member is appointed except that it is
not to extend more than a year from the original end of their term); 19 U.S.C. § 1330(b)(2)
(2012) (permitting an International Trade Commission member’s term to extend until
another member is appointed); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (stating that a Federal
Communications Commission member’s term shall continue until another member is
appointed or until the end of the next congressional session); 49 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012)
(expanding that a National Transportation Safety Board’s member may serve until another
member is appointed); see also Kali Borkoski, Political Consequences of NLRB v. Noel Canning,
SCOTUS BLOG (July 15, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/politicalconsequences-of-nlrb-v-noel-canning/ [http://perma.cc/YC2Z-ANQD] (opining that the
NLRB could use a holdover period similar to what some other administrative agencies use).
167
See 47 U.S.C. § 154 (enabling the FCC to operate). The FCC has both a similar structure
to the NLRB and the members’ terms are the same amount of years in length. See id.
(explaining the FCC’s structure and membership terms).
168
Id.
Compare FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, WHAT WE DO,
http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do [http://perma.cc/HL7J-76KA] [hereinafter FCC, WHAT
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The FCC is comprised of five commissioners, which the President
nominates and the Senate confirms.169 FCC members serve five year
terms, which end when another member is appointed or at the end of the
One of the
next congressional session after their term ends. 170
commissioners is designated as a chairman, but all of the commissioners
work together in the regulation of communication services around the
United States.171
In 1934, the FCC was created to regulate the radio, and now it does
that and more by regulating radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. 172
The FCC is the primary authority for communications law similar to the
NLRB as the primary authority for labor law. 173 Overall, the FCC
regulates communications law to ensure everyone’s rights are
respected.174
Due to the changes resulting from New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB and
NLRB v. Canning, the NLRB could decline in membership and not be able
to operate.175 Understanding the effect these changes have and the
Senate’s proposed solution is paramount to the realization that a change
is needed.176 Thus, Part III analyzes these changes to the NLRB and
proposes Congress amend the NLRB’s enabling statute.177
WE DO] (regulating “interstate and international communications . . . [as] the United States’
primary authority for communications law, regulation and technological innovation”), with
WHAT WE DO, supra note 3 (“[The NLRB acts as a] safeguard [for] employees’ rights to
organize and to determine whether to have unions as their bargaining representative. The
agency also acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices committed by private sector
employers and unions.”).
169
47 U.S.C. § 154.
170
Id. § 154(c). The FCC’s enabling statute states in relevant part:
[C]ommissioners shall be appointed for terms of five years and until
their successors are appointed and have been confirmed and taken the
oath of office, except that they shall not continue to serve beyond the
expiration of the next session of Congress subsequent to the expiration
of said fixed term of office . . . .
Id.
171
Id. This is similar to the commissioner’s role on the NLRB. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012)
(“The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board.”).
172
See FCC, WHAT WE DO, supra note 168 (explaining the FCC’s duties).
173
Id.; see Millhiser, supra note 4 (stating that without the NLRB no one will protect
workers’ rights). In addition, the FCC has many other bureaus and offices, which split up
the functions of the FCC. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, BUREAUS & OFFICES,
http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus-offices [http://perma.cc/4G9F-7QJT] (displaying all the
offices the FCC is split into). The FCC has seven different bureaus that each focus on a
different part of regulation in communications law. Id. There are also eleven different
offices, which house the departments of the FCC. Id.
174
FCC, WHAT WE DO, supra note 168.
175
See supra Part II.C–D (explaining the case law that affected the NLRB).
176
See infra Part III (exploring the effects on the NLRB and the Senate’s proposed bill).
177
See infra Part III (analyzing how these changes affect the NLRB as a whole and
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III. ANALYSIS
Despite the NLRB having a new five-member board and making
minor temporary fixes, it has not implemented a long-term fix to ensure
trust in future boards and to decrease the likelihood of falling below a
valid quorum again.178 In order for the NLRB to continue protecting
employee, employer, and union rights and remain operating as a decision
maker to stop unfair labor practices, it must maintain enough members to
constitute a quorum.179 Thus, the NLRB’s enabling statute must change to
allow the NLRB to safeguard itself from falling to fewer than three
members and becoming nonoperational.180
Part III.A examines the effect on current issues, importance of party
alignment, trust in the NLRB, and possibility of a declining
membership.181 Next, Part III.B discusses the Senate’s proposed bill to
change the composition of the NLRB.182 Last, Part III.C proposes an
amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute that would allow the NLRB to
maintain its quorum for a longer period of time, and addresses the
possible counterarguments to the amendment.183
A. The Future of the NLRB
NLRB v. Canning allowed many cases to be appealed.184 Any case the
invalidated members took a part in may be appealed, but the seven cases
previously discussed would have the greatest effect on labor and
employment law as a whole.185 Each of these cases are important to labor
and employment law and could result in changes to the employees’,
employers’, and unions’ position in each case if it were appealed.186

proposing an amendment to its’ enabling statute).
178
See infra Part III.C.1 (establishing a long term fix for the Board).
179
See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010) (explaining the quorum
requirement that was established); see also RIGHTS WE PROTECT, supra note 3 (displaying the
rights that the NLRB protects).
180
See supra Part II.C–D (describing two instances when the NLRB’s membership fell
below three).
181
See infra Part III.A (exploring the NLRB’s future).
182
See infra Part III.B (examining the Bill and why it will not work).
183
See infra Part III.C (proposing a change to the NLRB’s enabling statute and addressing
the possible counterarguments).
184
See supra Part II.D (explaining NLRB v. Canning); see also Keith et al., supra note 8 (stating
that all decisions the NLRB decided from January 2012 until August 2013 are void).
185
See Polsky, supra note 131 (noting seven cases, which could have a great effect on labor
and employment law); see also supra notes 134, 139, 146 and accompanying text (presenting
the seven cases, their facts, and how the courts held in each situation).
186
See supra Part II.E.1 (describing why each category is important).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 8

304

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

In addition to upsetting many cases, the NLRB v. Canning decision
could also affect the future of the NLRB. 187 The NLRB’s staff and the five
board members is a small group of people to do a large amount of work,
and with disruption, this task becomes even more difficult.188 The NLRB
also needs the citizens’ trust in order for employers, employees, and
unions to abide by its decisions.189 If there is no trust in the NLRB’s
decisions, employees will be unlikely to speak up and the federal court
system will become more involved in the labor and employment sector in
the United States.190 Overall, it is important for the NLRB to operate
smoothly and efficiently to achieve its goals and keep the trust of the
citizens it serves.191
Part III.A.1 reviews the current board operations and how the NLRB
is anticipating change in the near future.192 Next, Part III.A.2 examines
how party alignment affects the NLRB.193 Then, Part III.A.3 discusses the
public’s trust in the NLRB and why it is important to maintain. 194 Last,
Part III.A.4 explores how history repeated itself and the future dangers the
NLRB could face.195
1.

Current Board Operations

There are many cases that could change how employers, employees,
and unions cooperate with one another.196 A change in these rulings could
See supra Part II.D (discussing the NLRB v. Canning decision).
See supra Part II.B (explaining the structure of the NLRB); see also infra Part III.A.1–2
(displaying the current board operations and how the NLRB can make changes to its
membership).
189
See infra Part III.A.3 (stating how the NLRB is trying to establish more trust).
190
See infra Part III.A.3 (explaining why trust in the NLRB’s decisions is important); see also
infra Part III.A.4 (describing and analyzing the involvement of the federal courts).
191
See infra Part III.A.3 (considering the importance of trust in the NLRB’s decisions).
192
See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining how changes could affect the current operations of the
NLRB).
193
See infra Part III.A.2 (displaying the importance of party alignment).
194
See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing the public’s trust in the NLRB and why it is important).
195
See infra Part III.A.4 (illustrating the importance of history and how it could affect the
NLRB’s future).
196
See supra notes 134–51 and accompanying text (explaining some of the cases which
could change and why they are important). The three categories are employee policy, union
representation, and old precedent. See supra note 131 (noting the three categories). Employee
policy is comprised of: Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc.,
and Costco Wholesale Corporation. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–
13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *4 (Dec. 14, 2012); Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138,
2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19, 2012); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358
N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *16 (Sept. 7, 2012). Union
representation is comprised of: Alan Ritchey, Inc. and Banner Health System. Alan Ritchey,
Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10 (Dec. 14, 2012); Banner
Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2 (July 30, 2012). Old
187
188

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss1/8

Littlejohn: NLRB v. Canning Featuring the All-Powerful Senate: The National

2015]

The NLRB’s Journey to Extinction

305

give the employer too much power and effectively eliminate unions
altogether, which would decrease the enforcement of employees’ rights.197
If the NLRB reexamines these rulings, each ruling will take time and
resources from the NLRB and the parties because of the importance of
these issues.198
In addition to the possibility of many cases being reconsidered, the
NLRB as an entity is at stake.199 Even with a full five members, the NLRB
has many extraneous issues that need to be considered at the same time
as any case that it is currently deciding.200 NLRB v. Canning, although
decided in July 2014, will continue to disrupt the NLRB’s function until
every case that can be appealed is re-decided.201 If time has to be spent on
deciding issues that were already decided, the NLRB will have to take its
focus off of what is currently happening in the labor and employment
sector.202
Even though the NLRB has not re-examined any cases, there have
been multiple instances when the current Board’s focus shifted to past
problems, including: the unanimous ratification of administrative,
personnel, and procurement matters; the heightened media focus on the
NLRB causing it to weigh in on many extraneous issues; and the
discussion of a possible change in the NLRB’s makeup proposed by the
Senate’s new bill.203 Since the NLRB’s focus shifted to these issues, until
precedent is comprised of: Piedmont Gardens and WKTC-TV, Inc. Piedmont Gardens, 359
N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15, 2012); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359
N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *8 (Dec. 12, 2012).
197
See Millhiser, supra note 4 (illustrating the effect of giving employers too much power);
see also King & Leitch, supra note 111 (analyzing the impact of NLRB v. Canning). However,
if the NLRB’s membership stays the same, the rulings might not change at all. See Dubé,
supra note 99 (explaining that because the Board makeup is the same there will probably be
no “major policy shifts”).
198
See King & Leitch, supra note 111 (stating that reexamining cases could take an
extraordinary amount of time).
199
See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (holding that there was
not a valid quorum of members); see also NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014)
(invalidating President Obama’s recess appointments to the NLRB, which took away the
valid quorum).
200
See Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (“[A]ll five slots on the NLRB are now filled
by Senate-confirmed appointees—this solution is only temporary. NLRB members serve five
year terms, so the Senate GOP will get another opportunity to shut down federal labor law
when these terms expire . . . .”).
201
See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (holding that three of President Obama’s recess
appointments were invalid and requiring all of those members to vacate the NLRB).
202
See supra Part II.E.1 (describing the cases that may have to be examined).
203
See Office of Public Affairs, supra note 126 (ratifying all administrative, personnel, and
procurement matters); see also Mahoney, supra note 152 (commenting that this bill is a needed
reform for the NLRB due to one-sided decisions); Taylor, supra note 128 (opining that some
of the cases the NLRB is currently deciding will have a big impact on companies and the
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the NLRB resolves these matters, it will continue to take its eyes off current
issues.204
Although a replacement was found for Nancy Schiffer’s position on
the NLRB, there is still a concern that when Harry Johnson’s and Kent
Hirozawa’s terms end in the next two years, there will be no
replacements.205 In January 2015, the Senate will have a Republican
majority and the President will still be a Democrat, which means gridlock
is likely because there will probably not be an agreement on a presidential
appointment.206 In addition, depending on the results of the next
presidential election, gridlock could remain, which is why an amendment
is needed to the NLRB’s enabling statute.207
2.

The NLRB Should be Modified to be Able to Withstand Party
Alignment

The Senate’s alignment is important to the NLRB because it
determines whether a President’s NLRB nomination is confirmed.208 In
the past, when the President appointed a member belonging to the
political party opposite to the majority in the Senate, the nomination was
not confirmed.209 Recently, the Senate proposed the “nuclear option” to
prevent the delay of appointments; however, the “nuclear option” still
requires a Senate majority to vote in favor of the nomination. 210 Although
economy); Wemple, supra note 128 (remarking that the NLRB’s ruling for CNN was drastic
for affected workers).
204
See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (showing that some of the cases the NLRB may have to
reexamine are controversial decisions); see also Dubé, supra note 99 (admitting that this
reexamination will take the NLRB a lot of time); King & Leitch, supra note 111 (noting the
amount of cases the NLRB may have to reexamine); supra note 203 and accompanying text
(explaining all the current issues the NLRB’s focus shifted to).
205
See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (adding that if the Senate and President disagree on
appointees for these nominations, the NLRB will be in trouble); see also supra Part II.E
(discussing the aftermath of NLRB v. Canning).
206
See Flaherty, supra note 119 (stating that Republicans could vote against any
appointments President Obama makes); see also ROSENFELD, supra note 35, at 16–18
(expanding on the concepts that Republicans do not support unions and the comparison to
supporting the NLRB).
207
See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining the proposed amendment to the NLRB’s enabling
statute).
208
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing presidential appointment power); see also
supra Part II.B (explaining the presidential appointment process, and the requirement that
both steps of the process be met in order for someone to be appointed to the NLRB).
209
See, e.g., Nominations Failed/Returned, UNITED STATES SENATE (Jan. 3, 2014),
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/one_item_and_teasers/nom_rtn.htm
[http://perma.cc/EBF9-6FXJ] (displaying a list of executive nominations returned to the
President during the current Congress).
210
See Wolf, supra note 72 (describing all of the components of the “nuclear option”). See
also Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (stating the reasons why the Senate invoked the
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this new option puts less of a burden on the agreement of the Senate and
the President, the Senate can still delay the confirmation if they do not
agree with the President’s nomination simply by a majority not voting in
favor of the nomination. 211
The checks and balances system of presidential appointment is
important to ensure one branch does not have too much power.212
Unfortunately, in a political gridlock, the checks and balances system
provides a daunting obstacle for appointment. 213 In short, if there is not
an agreement on a nomination, no one will be appointed to the NLRB, and
without recess appointment power, the NLRB will not receive new
members until the President and Senate agree.214
The President’s party affiliation is also an important factor regarding
members being appointed to the NLRB. 215 Although the NLRB performs
many functions in labor and employment law, the NLRA created the
NLRB to ensure workers were able to collectively bargain and join unions;
many people are not in favor of keeping the NLRB operational for this
reason.216 In the past, some Presidents, notably Republicans, have not
appointed members to the NLRB for many years during their terms.217
Although this neglect has not destroyed the NLRB, with time, the lack of

“nuclear option”).
211
See Hatch, supra note 71, at 12 (stating that the threshold for nominations is now a
majority of Senate members rather than two-thirds). Even with the “nuclear option”
imposed, there still has to be a vote of fifty-one Senate members in favor of appointing the
nominee. Id.
212
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President the power to appoint members to
administrative positions with the advice and consent of the Senate).
213
See id. (requiring both the President and Senate to agree on an appointment). Although
this Note does not address a change to the appointment process, it seems that a change is
needed to ensure one party or branch cannot prevent appointments from being made.
214
See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (arguing that the next time there is a vacancy on the
NLRB and the President and Senate do not agree, there could be problems). If no one is
appointed, the NLRB’s membership will fall, which could result in gridlock on decisionmaking if there are two members from either party on the Board. Id.
215
See Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 225 (explaining all the ways partisanship
interrupted appointing members to the NLRB); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text
(comparing the President’s nominations to the NLRB).
216
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 16–20 (describing the creation of the
NLRB and the NLRB’s relation to collective bargaining and union membership). The NLRB
has a history of supporting unions, and it is a known fact that many Republicans are not
union supporters. See also ROSENFELD, supra note 35, at 16–18 (elaborating further on the
Republican disapproval of unions).
217
Compare BOARD MEMBERS SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (showing when each member of the
NLRB was appointed), with Prints and Photographs Division, supra note 79 (presenting a list
of all of the Presidents and the years they served). For example, President George W. Bush
did not appoint anyone to the NLRB between the beginning of 2006 until the end of his term
in 2009, which left the board with only two members from 2008 until 2010. Id.
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appointment by Presidents and the lack of agreement between the
President and the Senate could destroy the NLRB. 218
The NLRB’s operation depends on the Senate, the President, and their
party alignment.219 This Note does not propose to ameliorate the
cooperation problems between the Senate and the President, but rather
proposes a solution that will allow the NLRB to continue operation for a
longer period of time if the Senate and President do not agree.220
3.

Trust in the NLRB’s Decisions

NLRB v. Canning not only invalidated many cases, but also caused the
NLRB to lose the public’s trust in its decision making.221 In the past five
years, as a result of not having a valid quorum, there have been two
instances where hundreds of cases were invalidated.222 When the NLRB
decides cases, the parties expect that these decisions are final unless a
party appeals to a federal court. 223 Since the NLRB’s invalidations, this

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (demonstrating the requirement of the advice and
consent of the Senate in order to appoint members to administrative agencies). In addition
to the problems of appointment and agreement, the lack of union support and the dissolution
of unions could have an adverse effect on the NLRB. See Labor Day Brings Focus to Economy,
supra note 35 (showing a declining union membership). See also Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra
note 80, at 225 (stating the ways that conservatives in 2011 attempted to limit the NLRB’s
power). Critics Kahlenberg and Marvit stated that:
In 2011 alone, there were a variety of approaches that conservatives took
to limit the Board’s power, including Republican senators’ refusal to
confirm President Obama’s appointments to the Board, threats by
Republican members of the Board to resign in order to strip the Board
of a quorum and therefore its ability to adjudicate allegations of unfair
labor practices, the introduction of legislation designed to partially or
fully defund the Board, and the introduction of legislation designed to
abolish the Board and transfer its functions to the Department of Justice.
Id.
219
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presenting the requirements for presidential
appointment); see also supra note 209 and accompanying text (displaying how many
nominations failed confirmation to an administrative agency and how many have been
returned to the President).
220
See infra Part III.C (establishing a solution for the NLRB’s operation and appointment
problems).
221
See McQuillen, supra note 121 (raising issues of trust in past NLRB actions). These issues
of trust “add to the criticism of the board, which mediates disputes between labor and
employers.” Id.
222
See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) (invalidating President Obama’s
recess appointments to the NLRB); New Process Steel v. N.L.R.B., 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010)
(requiring the NLRB to have a quorum of three to decide cases).
223
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012) (establishing the process for appeals to NLRB decisions); see
also Lee III & Willging, supra note 62, at 770 (justifying that parties may not want to appeal
because of the high cost of entering the federal court system).
218
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expectation is changing and the trust that parties once had in the NLRB is
dwindling.224
This loss of trust could cause parties to cast doubt on the NLRB’s
decisions, which in turn could cause parties additional stress, time, and
money in the long run.225 For example, if the NLRB holds that an
employer wrongfully discharged an employee based on a collective
bargaining agreement interpretation, that employee will have his or her
job reinstated and possibly receive back-pay.226 Months later, after the
employer and employee have both made adjustments, they are informed
that the NLRB did not have a valid quorum to decide this case. 227 This
invalidation could trigger the employer to appeal the holding, which
would not only cost parties time and money, but would place the
employee in a state of limbo until the NLRB reexamines the case.228 In the
end, the NLRB caused the parties more stress, more money, and gave
them doubt in the NLRB’s future decisions.229
4.

History Repeats Itself

There have been several instances when the NLRB’s membership fell
below three.230 History is known to repeat itself, so there is a likely chance
that the NLRB’s membership will fall again.231 The decline of the NLRB’s
membership was only a small problem in the past because the President
See supra Part II.E.1 (explaining the cases which were invalidated).
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–17 (confirming that most federal
courts will uphold NLRB decisions); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text
(commenting how appealing to a federal circuit court can cause more problems).
226
See Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5
(Dec. 15, 2012) (requiring an employer to turn over the names of witnesses who reported a
nurse sleeping on the job in order to justify firing her). This scenario is based off of Piedmont
Gardens with some added facts to fit the scenario. Id. at *1–2.
227
See New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 688 (holding that the NLRB must have a three member
quorum to decide cases).
228
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 118 (noting that appealing to a federal
court puts both the employer and the employee in limbo); see also Lee III & Willging, supra
note 62, at 770 (describing that appealing to a federal court can cost between $15,000 and
$20,000).
229
See supra Part III.A.3 (elaborating on citizens’ trust in the NLRB). Piedmont Gardens was
on appeal and has finally been reexamined by the NLRB. Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B.
No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15, 2012) (adding that this case was
appealed in June 2013 and was not reexamined by the NLRB until June 2015); Piedmont
Gardens, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 2015 WL 4179692 at *8 (June 26, 2015) (affirming the previous
ruling).
230
See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (showing the amount of members
on the Board every year since the Board’s creation).
231
See Millhiser, supra note 4 (“When the current members terms expire, however, a
Supreme Court decision gutting the recess appointments power could make it impossible to
fill the NLRB’s vacant seats.”).
224
225
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had the power to recess-appoint members if the Senate did not agree on
his nomination.232 Now, however, the problem of a declining membership
will be more difficult to fix because recess appointment power is
limited.233
If the NLRB’s membership falls below three members, it does not have
a quorum to decide cases according to New Process Steel.234 Without a way
to decide cases, the NLRB cannot help employers, employees, or unions
with their labor and employment issues.235 This decline in membership
leaves the parties with no choice but to appeal to federal court if they are
unhappy with the regional NLRB’s decision. 236 As a result, this decline
would cause the federal courts to be flooded with labor and employment
issues.237
The federal courts are not experts in labor and employment law. 238 If
the federal courts handled every appeal to a regional NLRB decision, it
would defeat the purpose of having an administrative agency that has an
expertise in labor and employment law. 239 The federal courts already
handle a multitude of issues and are overburdened by other cases.240 If
the courts added labor and employment issues to the list of cases they
must handle, these issues would further congest the court system. 241 In
addition, if parties appeal cases to the federal courts, the cost and time

232
See id. (explaining that without recess appointment power, filling NLRB seats will be
even more difficult); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (displaying the Recess Appointments
Clause).
233
See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2566, 2575 (2014) (analyzing that recess
appointments are allowed only when the Senate has taken a break for longer than ten days,
and the Senate gets to declare when it is in session).
234
See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010) (holding that three
members constitutes a quorum for the NLRB).
235
See 159 CONG. REC. S302 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2013) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander)
(stating that without three members, the NLRB cannot decide cases or issue regulations).
236
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–20 (explaining the NLRB’s relation
to the federal courts).
237
See Jamieson, supra note 160 (arguing that the Senate’s bill will “create new burdens on
already clogged federal courts that lack the NLRB’s expertise on labor relations”); see also
supra note 65 and accompanying text (establishing the argument that federal courts could
become overburdened without a national level to the NLRB).
238
See Dotan, supra note 63, at 1022 (noting that administrative agencies have more
expertise than Federal Courts); see also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–17
(admitting that because federal courts are not experts in labor and employment law they
rarely change NLRB rulings).
239
See Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 226 (arguing that without the NLRB “the
effect on workers would be dramatic” because there would be no one with an expertise in
enforcing the NLRA).
240
See Introduction, supra note 65, at 685 (describing that the overburdening of the federal
court system leads to delay and more expenses).
241
See id. (discussing the overburdening of the federal court system).
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parties spend on each case will increase.242 Thus, without the NLRB to
decide cases, both parties involved in the conflict and the federal court
system would be unduly burdened.
The future of the NLRB is in jeopardy.243 If there is not a change to the
NLRB’s enabling statute in the future, the NLRB could face membership
decline to the point of extinction.244 This amendment to the NLRB’s
enabling statute is important to not only keep the NLRB operational, but
also to protect employee, employer, and union rights. 245 The NLRB was
created to provide expertise in labor and employment law and this Note
proposes a solution to ensure that expertise can still be exercised.246
B. The Senate’s Proposed Bill is Not a Solution to the NLRB’s Problems
In short, the Bill is an amendment that would obstruct the NLRB’s
function in the future.247 Although the NLRB needs a change, the Bill is
not the solution to the NLRB’s problems because it will end in a
nonfunctional Board.248 The Senate’s Proposed Bill would amend the
NLRB to function much like the Federal Election Commission, which has
been known as one of the most ineffective administrative agencies due to
its gridlock and inaction.249 There are many reasons why the Bill is not a
solution to the NLRB’s problems, such as: gridlock in decision-making,

See Lee III & Willging, supra note 62, at 770 (stating that the average median cost for
taking a civil case to federal court is $15,000 for the plaintiff and $20,000 for the defendant).
243
See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2566, 2575 (2014) (eliminating most recess
appointment power); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010)
(requiring three members for a quorum).
244
See Millhiser, supra note 4 (“Ultimately, the fate of the NLRB—and of American labor
law—will hinge upon who controls the Senate and the White House. If both the president
and the Senate want America to continue to have labor law in 2018, then confirming new
NLRB members should not be an issue.”).
245
See infra Part III.C (describing the change the NLRB needs to make to its enabling
statute). See also Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 226 (explaining the effect on workers
when the NLRB is extinct). A former Chairman on the NLRB and a current Stanford Law
professor said that if there was no NLRB “[w]orkers illegally fired for union organizing
won’t be reinstated with back pay. Employers will be able to get away with interfering with
union elections. Perhaps most important, employers won’t have to recognize unions despite
a majority vote by workers.” Id.
246
See infra Part III.C (elaborating on the proposed solution to the NLRB’s problems).
247
See supra Part II.E.2 (establishing the components of the Bill).
248
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. (2014) (showing the elements of the Bill); see also supra Part II.E.2
(noting the components of the Bill).
249
See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2012) (explaining the Federal Election Commission’s structure);
Franz, supra note 154, at 167 (stating that the Federal Election Commission is one of the most
ineffective agencies and was designed by Congress to be slow and ineffective); see also
Mahoney, supra note 152 (commenting that the Bill transforms the NLRB to the same
organization as the Federal Election Commission).
242
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possible loss of funding, and a harsher appointment quota and
standard.250
One of the reasons the Bill will not fix the NLRB’s current problems is
that this change will create gridlock. 251 The Bill requires two members
from each party to agree on a solution, which would be a difficult, if not
an impossible task for the NLRB.252 As previously stated, the NLRB must
take either the employee or management side, and it is known that many
employment rights supporters and management supporters do not
agree.253 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that members who support
opposite views would agree on any issue. 254 In addition, it is rare for
parties to make decisions against party lines. 255 For example, Congress
often goes into gridlock because parties will not vote against party lines.256
Creating gridlock on the NLRB will be detrimental to its operation because
even with a full board, decisions will not be made if the parties cannot
agree.257
The Bill will also hinder the NLRB because it could cause the NLRB to
lose its funding.258 If the NLRB does go into gridlock on some decisions,

See infra Part II.E.2 (displaying the components of the Bill).
Compare S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (noting the requirement that two Democrat
members and two Republican members be in favor of the vote in order for it to go through),
with Phenicie, supra note 127 (stating that an even number of Republican and Democrat
members creates gridlock).
252
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(C) (explaining the requirements of the agreement of
the Senate and the President to appoint members to the NLRB).
253
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 176 (reasoning that the conflict between
union and management will not end any time soon). Critics argue that:
Although one might wish that labor and management could find a
common ground in accepting both the statutory rules that Congress has
laid down in the Labor Act and the Board’s role as impartial arbiter of
those rules, there is little evidence that partisan bickering and hostility
will soon disappear.
Id.; see also Jamieson, supra note 160 (adding that “[a] permanent, even split along partisan
lines” would allow “contentious labor cases” to go on for a long time and this is comparable
to “establishing a 10-member Supreme Court, permanently comprised of five liberals and
five conservatives”).
254
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 176 (discussing that it seems unlikely
that parties will find a common ground).
255
See Mann, supra note 152 (stating that Congress is reflecting ideological differences and
creating more gridlock).
256
See Blake, supra note 152 (“[T]he percentage of gridlocked . . . issues has more than
doubled since 1950 and is close to a new high . . . .”).
257
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (explaining that two members from either party must
agree on a holding); see also Gerhards, supra note 153 (commenting on the portions of the
Bill).
258
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a) (declaring that the NLRB must decide ninety percent of
its cases within the first year in order to maintain its normal funding).
250
251
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it will run the risk of losing twenty percent of its funding.259 This scenario
could happen easily because ten percent is a small number of cases to
disagree about.260 For example, if the NLRB handled 500 cases during the
year after this amendment is passed, it would only need to be gridlocked
on fifty-one cases to lose twenty percent of its funding.261 When any
agency loses funding, it has fewer resources to accomplish its goals. 262
Finally, the Bill is not the solution the NLRB needs because it would
require even more members to be appointed with a harsher appointment
standard.263 The NLRB has a history of struggling to maintain enough
members for a quorum of three.264 However, the Bill raises that
requirement to four members for a quorum.265 This provision means that
the quorum requirement will not only be hard to meet because members
might not agree, but also because membership could very easily fall below
four.266 In addition, the Bill requires the President and Senate to agree two
times in order for a member to be appointed. 267 NLRB v. Canning arose
because the Senate and President could not agree on appointing members
to the NLRB, and in that instance the President and Senate only needed to
agree once.268 This feat was difficult then, and it will be nearly impossible
for them to agree twice.269

259
See id. (requiring the decision of ninety percent of cases within the first year, or there
will be a loss of twenty percent funding).
260
See Jamieson, supra note 160 (articulating that this funding would be easy to lose
because a “dead-even partisan split” would make it even more difficult to reach decisions).
261
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a) (establishing percentage requirements to lose funding).
262
See id. (promoting the decrease in funding of the NLRB); see also H.R. 1, 112th Cong.
(2011) (calling for an eighteen percent decrease in the NLRB’s budget).
263
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(C) (creating the new requirements for appointment).
264
See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (depicting the NLRB’s membership
since the Board’s creation).
265
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(B)–(C) (stating the new membership requirement of
six members).
266
See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (predicting that the next time a vacancy is not filled
because the President and Senate do not agree, there could be problems).
267
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(C) (requiring the President to consult the opposite
party leader in the Senate for appointment and for the Senate to consent to the nomination).
268
See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014) (highlighting why the invalidated
members were on the Board and showing why President Obama used the recess
appointment power); see also U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (explaining that the Senate must
confirm presidential appointments).
269
See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557 (limiting the President’s recess appointment power); see
also Bolton, supra note 103 (commenting that the reason President Obama had to use recess
appointment power was because the Senate continually refused to confirm his
appointments, and the Senate even conducted pro forma sessions to prevent recess
appointments).
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If passed, the Bill will turn the NLRB into a non-functional
administrative agency similar to the Federal Election Commission. 270 It
imposes requirements on the NLRB that, based on the Board’s history,
would be impossible to achieve.271 Overall, the Bill is not a solution; it is
a plan to dissolve the NLRB altogether.272
C. A Solution for the Future
The NLRB should use the FCC’s model to rewrite its enabling
statute.273 The agencies are similar in structure and both are experts in
their respective areas of law, which require regulation.274 In addition, the
FCC has never had a membership issue.275 The FCC’s enabling statute, in
pertinent part, states:
[C]ommissioners shall be appointed for terms of five
years and until their successors are appointed and have
been confirmed and taken the oath of office, except that
they shall not continue to serve beyond the expiration of
the next session of Congress subsequent to the expiration
of said fixed term of office . . . .276
The NLRB’s enabling statute does not have a provision which extends a
member’s term until a new member is appointed.277 This Note
recommends an amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute that includes
this language.278
First, Part III.C.1 establishes the amendment that Congress should
make to the NLRB’s enabling statute.279 Next, Part III.C.2 addresses the
See Franz, supra note 154, at 167 (establishing why the Federal Election Commission is
an ineffective commission). The Federal Election Commission has gone into gridlock many
times and rarely makes any decisions. Id. In addition, it seems as though it was organized
this way in order to make sure it was unable to act. Id.
271
See supra Part II.A (reviewing the history of the NLRB); see also S. 2814, 113th Cong.
(showing the requirements the Bill imposes).
272
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. (displaying the Bill); see also Jamieson, supra note 160 (“This is
the destruction of the NLRB, and they know it . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
273
See supra Part II.F (explaining the FCC and its organizational structure).
274
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (comparing the functions of the NLRB and
FCC).
275
See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMISSIONERS FROM 1934 TO PRESENT,
http://www.fcc.gov/leadership/commissioners-1934-present
[http://perma.cc/L2F9946M] (discussing the continuing membership of the FCC).
276
47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012).
277
See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (illustrating the provisions of the NLRB’s enabling statute).
278
See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining the language that should be added to the NLRB’s
enabling statute).
279
See infra Part III.C.1 (stating the text which should be added to 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012)).
270
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commentary and possible counterarguments regarding this
amendment.280 Overall, this amendment would be an immediate and
long-term solution to the NLRB’s operational problem. 281
1.

Proposed Amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 153

Amending the NLRB’s enabling statute will allow the NLRB to
maintain a larger membership for a longer period of time and help to
dissolve any possible gridlock with the election of a new Senate. 282 The
enabling statute with the amendment will state:
(a) Creation, composition, appointment, and tenure;
Chairman; removal of members
The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called
the “Board”) created by this subchapter prior to its
amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 [29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of
the United States, except that the Board shall consist of
five instead of three members, appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Of the
two additional members so provided for, one shall be
appointed for a term of five years and the other for a term
of two years. Their successors, and the successors of the
other members, shall be appointed for terms of five years
each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a
vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term
of the member whom he shall succeed. If, when a board
member’s term is set to expire, a new board member has not yet
been appointed, then the current board member shall extend his
term until a new member is appointed, except that his term shall
not extend beyond the end of the next congressional session.
The President shall designate one member to serve as
Chairman of the Board. Any member of the Board may
be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing,
for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no
other cause.283

See infra Part III.C.2 (addressing the counterarguments to this Note’s solution).
See supra Part II.C–D (describing two times in which the NLRB was unable to function).
282
See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (displaying the current enabling statute of the NLRB). This Note
proposes changes to the current form of this statute.
283
The regular portion of the text comes from 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). The italicized portion of
the text represents the additions made by the author. In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)–(d) are
280
281
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Commentary

This amendment is a proven solution of other independent agencies,
and it will be the best solution to the NLRB’s membership problems. 284
Most importantly, the proposed amendment allows the NLRB to meet its
quorum requirement for longer periods of time.285 When a member’s term
ends after five years, if the President and Senate have not agreed upon a
new member, the old member will stay on the NLRB and continue
working.286 This extension would end at the earlier of either: (1) the
Senate and President agreeing on a new member; or (2) the end of the next
congressional session.287 This process allows for a new Congress to be
elected, the possibility of a change in Congress’ political majority, and
more time for the President and Senate to reach an agreement on a new
member.288
This amendment is also necessary because the intent when creating
the NLRB was not for it to be inactive, but for it to be able to aid the people
of this country and the bodies of government by deciding and
administrating the labor laws of the country. 289 The NLRA created the
NLRB for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the NLRA, and it is
recommended to remain the same.
284
See Borkoski, supra note 166 (stating that a holdover provision has worked with other
agencies). It is important that this solution is implemented as soon as possible because next
year is when members’ terms begin to end and without this amendment and recess
appointments, there is a chance that no one will be appointed to the NLRB. See id. (opining
that appointments will be difficult in the future).
285
See New Process Steel, L.P., 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010) (holding that three members
constitute a quorum for the NLRB).
286
See supra Part III.C.1 (displaying the proposed amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)).
287
See 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (establishing the FCC’s power as a commission). This
proposed amendment is modeled off of the language from the FCC’s enabling statute. See
47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (showing the language that makes up the FCC’s enabling statute).
288
See Borkoski, supra note 166 (discussing that allowing for a holdover period would help
the NLRB to fix its problems). Although this solution does not fix the problems of recess
appointments and the President and Senate not agreeing on an appointee, it does give the
NLRB more time and allows for a new Congress to be elected, which could solve the
disagreement between the President and Senate. Id.
289
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 16–20 (explaining the creation of the
NLRB). If the NLRB were to cease to exist:
[T]here will be no one to enforce workers’ rights to join a union without
intimidation from their employer. No one to enforce workers’ rights to
join together to oppose abusive work conditions. And no one to make
an employer actually bargain with a union. Without an NLRB to enforce
the law, it may be possible for an employer to round up all of their prounion workers, fire them, and then replace them with anti-union scabs
who will immediately call a vote to decertify the union.
Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14; see also supra Part II.A (examining the history of the
NLRB).
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imperative that the NLRB have the power to do so.290 Without an
enforcement board, the NLRA would not be followed and employees
would not have any guarantees in their rights. 291
This amendment is the best solution to solve the NLRB’s membership
problems because it can be easily implemented and it is a small change
that will have a large impact on the NLRB.292 The amendment simply
adds one sentence to the NLRB’s enabling statute.293 It would not change
the appointment process, and it would not take any power away from
either the Senate or the President.294 This change will allow the NLRB to
decide more cases with a valid board and will encourage the Senate to
negotiate with the President prior to the end of the next congressional
session.295 Overall, this small change could have a large impact on the
NLRB’s operation.296
Critics may argue that the Bill is a better solution than this amendment
because it will “take the politics out of it” and turn the NLRB into an
umpire.297 Although the Bill may require Republican and Democratic
members of the NLRB to find common ground on some issues, it will most
likely gridlock the NLRB on controversial or difficult issues.298 The
solution this Note proposes still allows for the Senate to check the
President’s nomination by voting either for it to pass or sending it back to
290
See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (creating the
original NLRA); see also S. 1958, 74th Cong. (1935) (highlighting that the intent to create the
NLRB was to enforce the NLRA).
291
See Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (arguing that without an NLRB there would
be no one enforce the proper treatment of workers); see also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra
note 30, at 18 (stating that President Roosevelt commented that the NLRB will create a better
relationship between employees and employers).
292
See The Legislative Process, supra note 15 (explaining how a statute is amended). First, a
bill must be proposed which is structured similar to the Senate’s bill. Id. The bill must pass
a majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Id. Last, the President
must sign the bill and then 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) will be amended. Id.
293
See supra note 283 and accompanying text (displaying the proposed sentence that
should be added to the NLRB’s enabling statute).
294
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (mandating both the President and Senate confirm an
appointment to an administrative agency).
295
See Borkoski, supra note 166 (suggesting that a holdover period after the end of
someone’s term may help to fix the NLRB’s membership problems); see also FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, supra note 275 (displaying the FCC’s membership from the
time it was created). The amendment is modeled off of the language from the FCC’s enabling
statute. See 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (showing the FCC’s enabling statute).
296
See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (illustrating all the vacancies the
NLRB has had).
297
See Cox, supra note 152 (arguing that the Bill is a good solution).
298
See Jamieson, supra note 160 (“It is possible that on some issues, the six members might
find a common ground, in the interest of deciding cases, . . . [b]ut for anything novel,
controversial or difficult, it is hard to see how they would find a way forward. They would
spend a lot of time negotiating, I guess. Or at war.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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the President.299 The Bill will cause cases to be unresolved for years and
could possibly result in a loss of twenty percent of the funding if there is
gridlock.300 Therefore, the proposed amendment to the NLRB’s enabling
statute this Note proposes is a better solution because it will allow more
time for less-partisan members to be appointed—which satisfies the Bill’s
goal of less partisanship on the board—and will not threaten the NLRB’s
dissolution by creating more gridlock.301
Furthermore, critics may argue that this amendment will only delay
the possible bad times where the NLRB will not have enough members to
operate. This argument is flawed because it does not consider that by
delaying the end to a member’s term, there could be a change in the
composition of the Senate, which would allow for agreement on a new
appointment.302 In addition, this amendment allows the NLRB more time
to make decisions on cases regarding unfair labor practices.303 In short,
this amendment does not delay bad times; it proposes a practical solution
to the NLRB’s membership problem.304
Finally, critics may argue that the NLRB’s dissolution might not be a
bad thing, considering the Board’s inactivity. If this were true and the
NLRB was dissolved, the United States would revert back to the times
before the NLRB was created.305 Before the NLRB was created, many
corporations and unions resorted to violence to solve their problems and
employees were voiceless in their workplaces.306 Without the NLRB,
employees would have to go to the federal courts about their problems in
the workplace, which takes much more time and money for both the
employee and the courts.307 Although the NLRB has lost its quorum a few
times within the past five years, it has still been there to remedy those
situations, and without the NLRB, employees would have no guarantee of
299
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring both the President and Senate to agree on a
presidential appointment to an agency).
300
See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a) (2014) (establishing that two Republicans and two
Democrats must agree on every decision passed and if ninety percent of the cases are not
decided within a year the NLRB will lose twenty percent of its funding); see also Jamieson,
supra note 160 (scrutinizing that the Bill is not a solution to the NLRB’s problems).
301
See supra Part III.C.1 (explaining the amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute).
302
See supra Part III.C.1 (displaying that a member’s term shall not end until someone else
is appointed or until the end of the next congressional session, whichever is sooner).
303
See supra Part II.F (expanding on how this works with the FCC); see also supra Part III.C.1
(showing the amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute).
304
See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (establishing the members on the
NLRB and how many vacancies and recess appointments the Board has had).
305
See supra Part II.A (describing the history of the NLRB).
306
See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 184–85 (asserting that the NLRB fixed
problems with violence and workers being heard in the workplace).
307
See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons why federal
courts would be overburdened and are not experts in administrative law).
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their rights.308 Overall, the proposed amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 153 is the
best solution to solve the NLRB’s membership problems.309
IV. CONCLUSION
Every agency is created for a reason—the NLRA created the NLRB
because it needed an agency to enforce the rights the NLRA guarantees.310
The NLRB is on the verge of extinction because there have been two major
instances in the past five years that have rendered the agency powerless.311
The current NLRB members’ terms will end at varying points from now
until 2018, and if no amendment is made to the NLRB’s enabling statute,
there will be more opportunities for the NLRB to lose its quorum. 312
Amending the NLRB’s enabling statute is a minor change to allow
membership to extend for a longer period of time.313 If this change is
implemented, Grace, the teacher from Part I, will have a way to appeal to
the NLRB and possibly get her job back.314 This solution would not only
give the NLRB more time to operate, but also more time for the President
and Senate to agree on a nomination. 315 The NLRB needs a change and
the proposed amendment will allow it to withstand the disagreement in
appointing members.316
Elizabeth Littlejohn*
308
See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text (showing the effect of more cases on the
federal courts). See also supra Part II.C–D (showing the two times in the past five years the
NLRB has lost its quorum).
309
See supra note 283 and accompanying text (resolving the NLRB’s problems); see also
supra Part III.C.2 (evaluating why the solution this Note proposes is the best solution).
310
See supra Part II.A (expanding on the creation of the NLRB).
311
See supra Part II.C–D (describing both of the cases that caused the NLRB to be
powerless).
312
See supra Part III.D (enabling the NLRB to act for a longer period of time).
313
See supra Part III.C.1 (showing the proposed amendment to the NLRB’s enabling
statute).
314
See supra Part I (establishing the fictional scenario involving Grace).
315
See supra Part III.C (examining the amendment and the counterarguments and
defenses).
316
See supra Part III.C.2 (arguing why the proposed amendment is a good solution against
all the counterarguments).
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